• Anthropic, Rwanda’s government, and ALX launched Chidi, an AI mentor built on Claude.

• It will reach over 200,000 learners across Africa. Rwanda is training 2,000 teachers and civil servants to use it in classrooms.

• By 2030, 70% of digital jobs will need basic skills, but only 9% of youth have them. Chidi helps bridge this gap with critical thinking and coding support.

Anthropic announced on November 18 a partnership with the Government of Rwanda and African tech training provider ALX to introduce Chidi, an AI learning companion built on Claude, to hundreds of thousands of learners across Africa.

Rwanda’s Ministries of ICT & Innovation and Education are integrating Chidi into the national education system, training up to 2,000 teachers and civil servants in AI classroom applications. Graduates will receive year-long access to Claude tools to enhance AI literacy in education and government. Paula Ingabire, Minister of ICT & Innovation, said, “This collaboration enhances learning, supports educators, and builds a workforce ready for the 21st century.”

ALX will deploy Chidi across its programs, reaching over 200,000 students across the continent. The AI acts as a “Socratic mentor,” encouraging critical thinking through guided questions instead of direct answers. Early feedback shows high engagement, with learners tackling advanced coding and data science challenges.

The initiative builds on Anthropic’s global AI education efforts, including national pilots in Iceland, collaborations with the London School of Economics, and growing operations in India. The company aims to ensure AI expands opportunities and serves communities worldwide.

Africa faces a significant digital skills gap, with low technology adoption among firms, limiting productivity and hampering job creation, especially in areas that require higher-level skills. By 2030, 70% of digital skills demand is expected to be for basic-level capabilities, yet an OECD survey across 15 African countries shows only 9% of youth currently possess these essential skills. This mismatch between demand and preparedness underscores the importance of initiatives like Chidi, which aim to build foundational and advanced digital competencies across the continent.

Across the continent, similar AI and digital education initiatives are gaining traction. In Ghana, AI tools are being used in underserved neighborhoods, such as Accra’s Chorkor district, to teach digital literacy and spark interest in technology among youth. Kenya has also stepped forward with the Kenya Artificial Intelligence Skilling Alliance (KAISA), launched by the Kenya Private Sector Alliance (KEPSA) in partnership with Microsoft, to coordinate AI skills development, innovation, and policy collaboration across key economic sectors.

Meanwhile, in Rwanda, another complementary initiative is addressing the foundational layer of digital inclusion. The Airtel Africa Foundation, in partnership with the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), launched a program to expand digital skills training nationwide. The initiative provides free routers, Wi-Fi, and data to Digital Transformation Centres (DTCs) in underserved communities. These developments directly tackle one of Africa’s most pressing development challenges: the widening gap between digital access and digital competency.

Hikmatu Bilali

• The Tax Authority is preparing a Mineral Atlas to consolidate geological, chemical, and economic data on minerals with industrial and commercial potential.

• The tool is designed to support harmonised classification criteria, revision of tax rates, and the implementation of reference prices for minerals.

• The initiative follows AT’s recovery of 301.3 million meticais in mining tax debts and identification of 2 billion meticais owed over the past five years.

Mozambique’s Tax Authority (AT) has initiated a consultation process to establish a national Mineral Atlas to centralise data on mineral resources and improve the taxation of mining activities. According to the institution, the document is being developed in coordination with the Ministry of Mineral Resources and Energy, through the National Mining Institute (INAMI) and the Kimberley Process Management Unit (UGPK), with technical support from the Efficient Taxation for Inclusive Development Programme (TEDI).

The Atlas brings together geological, chemical, and economic information on minerals and rocks with industrial and commercial potential. The AT, as quoted by the Club of Mozambique, said the instrument is intended to harmonize classification standards, support revisions to tax rates, and consolidate data needed for fiscal transparency in the extractive sector. The final version will also include laboratory analyses of minerals found in Mozambique.

According to AT data published earlier, the authority identified 2 billion meticais in unpaid mining surface fees and production taxes over the past five years. In the first half of the year, the government issued 1,858 mining licenses and recovered 301.3 million meticais in overdue taxes. A further 223.4 million meticais in enforceable guarantees were recorded to support the rehabilitation and closure of abandoned mines.

The Mineral Atlas is being developed amid tightening controls on the extractive sector. In March, the government announced new rules governing the use of mineral and energy resources and highlighted its intention to free areas classified as “idle” for exploitation. Mozambique had approximately 3,000 exploration licenses under its mining and energy portfolio.

By consolidating reference prices, identification data, and regions of mineral occurrence, the Mineral Atlas will serve as a unified technical basis for determining the value of mining products and supporting the efficient taxation of mining operations, according to reporting by The Club of Mozambique.

By Cynthia Ebot Takang

• Africa’s instant payment systems processed 64 billion transactions worth $1.98 trillion in 2024, according to AfricaNenda.
• The continent counted 36 operational instant payment systems in June 2025, including 3 regional schemes (PAPSS, GIMACPAY, TCIB).
• Nigeria’s NIBSS Instant Payment remains the only system to reach a ‘mature inclusivity’ level.

Instant payment systems (IPS) expanded rapidly across Africa over the past five years, although only one system reached a mature level of inclusivity that covers all use cases, offers strong consumer-redress mechanisms and keeps end-user fees low.

Africa’s active IPS processed a record 64 billion transactions worth $1.98 trillion in 2024, according to a report released on 13 November by AfricaNenda Foundation, an independent organisation promoting payment system development on the continent.

The report, titled “The State of Inclusive Instant Payment Systems in Africa 2025 (SIIPS 2025)”, was produced with the World Bank and the UN Economic Commission for Africa. The document says the number of transactions grew 35% annually on average between 2020 and 2024, while total transaction value grew 26% annually during the same period.

Based on data from public and private stakeholders and African central banks, the report says Africa hosted 36 operational IPS in June 2025, up from 31 one year earlier. These include 33 national systems and three regional systems: the Pan-African Payment and Settlement System (PAPSS), GIMACPAY in CEMAC, and TCIB in SADC.

Between July 2024 and June 2025, five new 24/7/365 systems went live: Switch Mobile (Algeria), Fast Payment Module (Eswatini), LYPay (Libya), Salone Payment Switch (Sierra Leone) and Somalia Instant Payment System (SIPS).

Seven countries — Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa and Tanzania — operate multiple IPS. In total, 31 African countries host instant payment systems. This figure should rise sharply as 19 additional countries, including Benin, Botswana, Guinea, Liberia, Mauritania and Madagascar, develop new systems.

The report identifies 16 inter-domain IPS, which connect multiple payment instruments such as bank accounts and mobile-money wallets. Mobile-money IPS (10) rank second, followed by bank-only IPS (6). Africa also counts one central-bank digital currency-based system: Nigeria’s eNaira.

Bank-led IPS recorded the strongest growth in processed volume, expanding 28% between 2023 and 2024, ahead of inter-domain systems (9%) and mobile-money systems (7%).

This trend also drove value growth. Bank IPS posted a 50% jump in value between 2023 and 2024, compared to 29% for inter-domain systems and 25% for mobile-money systems.

Average transaction values fell. Bank IPS dropped from $251 to $154 per transaction. Inter-domain averages fell from $225 to $95, while mobile-money IPS posted the lowest value at $11 per transaction.

Mobile Apps Dominate User Channels

The report says mobile apps remain the most used channel across Africa, with 33 systems relying on app-based payments, reflecting rising smartphone penetration.

USSD protocols rank second, with 25 systems using this channel to reach users with basic phones.

Browser-based banking comes third (22), followed by QR-code solutions (20) and human-assisted channels such as bank agents (16). POS terminals, ATMs and NFC channels rank lowest.

A total of 35 IPS support person-to-person (P2P) transfers and 27 systems support person-to-business (P2B) payments. Fifteen systems enable person-to-government (P2G) payments such as tax payments, and 16 systems support business-to-business (B2B) payments.

Only 11 systems support government-to-person (G2P) disbursements like pensions or social transfers, and 11 systems support cross-border payments.

The report says only one IPS in Africa has achieved a mature inclusivity level: Nigeria’s NIBSS Instant Payment. The system covers all use cases, maintains consumer-redress mechanisms exceeding regulatory baselines, and keeps end-user costs low.

However, 10 systems are progressing toward mature inclusivity, including GIMACPAY, EthSwitch (Ethiopia), National Financial Switch (Zambia), Mobile Money Interoperability (Ghana) and Instant Payment Network (Egypt).

Fifteen IPS remain at a basic inclusivity level, integrating only the most common channels and minimal functionality, while 10 systems remain unclassified due to missing data or failure to meet baseline criteria.

This article was initially published in French by Walid Kéfi

Adapted in English by Ange Jason Quenum

• South Sudan has asked CNPC and ONGC Videsh for $2.5 billion in new oil-backed loans despite already owing $2.2 billion.
• A London court ordered the country to pay Afreximbank $657 million after a default, while BB Energy and Vitol pursue claims for undelivered cargoes.
• The IMF and UN warn that rising oil-collateral debt threatens the sustainability of South Sudan’s $3.7 billion debt stock.

South Sudan has formally requested $2.5 billion in oil-backed loans from two foreign companies: $1 billion from India’s ONGC Videsh and $1.5 billion from China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC).

The government proposes to secure the loans with future crude shipments and to repay them over 54 months after disbursement. The Oil Ministry says the funds will support official spending.

This new request adds to the more than $2.2 billion in oil-backed debt contracted since independence in 2011. The IMF and the United Nations warn that these loans undermine debt sustainability, with total public debt estimated at $3.7 billion at the end of 2023.

A London court ordered South Sudan to pay $657 million to Afreximbank after a default. Other creditors, including BB Energy and Vitol, have launched legal proceedings for nondelivery of crude.

The new borrowing request comes as external pressure intensifies and as creditors seek to enforce contractual obligations.

An October 2025 report from the Sudd Institute says the country’s reliance on oil-collateralised loans reflects the failure to implement the 2013 Petroleum Act. The law required the creation of a stabilisation account and a future-generations fund to absorb oil-market shocks.

The government never established these mechanisms. Their absence enabled a parallel system in which oil advances became a de facto budget instrument.

Economist Bec George Anyak says the deterioration stems not from external shocks but from “a collapse of governance.” Oil revenues account for more than 90% of public income, and debt-service obligations and off-budget spending absorb a growing share of these flows.

The United Nations adds that corruption in the management of oil revenues helped fuel political violence, including the 2013–2018 civil war that killed an estimated 400,000 people.

South Sudan produced only 72,000 barrels per day in 2024. The decline weakens its ability to meet debt commitments and finance public expenditure.

Analysts warn that, without deep reforms, Juba risks another severe financial crisis. The Sudd Institute recommends a moratorium on oil-backed loans, the creation of a public debt registry and full enforcement of the Petroleum Act.

By continuing to trade oil for credit, South Sudan endangers its budget stability. The crude that was meant to fund reconstruction now risks driving a new economic breakdown.

This article was initially published in French by Olivier de Souza

Adapted in English by Ange Jason Quenum

• Elemental says it has received no royalty payments from Wahgnion since the state acquired the mine in Q3 2024.
• Burkina Faso received a CFA10 billion BOAD facility to boost output but has not fulfilled all commitments.
• Endeavour has received $50.2 million of a $60 million fixed consideration but has not reported receiving its 3% royalty.

Elemental Altus Royalties says an external audit has been running at Wahgnion for several months. The company reaffirmed on 12 November that it has received no royalty payments since the government bought the asset in the third quarter of 2024.

The state took control of the mine to end a disagreement between Endeavour, which initially owned Wahgnion, and Lilium, which had purchased it earlier.

Elemental belongs to the class of mining companies that do not operate mines but hold rights to future revenue streams. Wahgnion carries a 1% net smelter return (NSR) royalty, which covers the value of gold sold after deducting refining and processing costs.

The agreement originally linked Elemental to Endeavour. The obligation now sits with the Société de Participation Minière du Burkina, which runs the mine on behalf of the state.

Elemental says in its third-quarter financial report: “The company has received all royalty statements from the Wahgnion management team for the 2024 fiscal year and has received payment for the first two quarters of 2024, but has not yet received payment for the second half of 2024. In addition, the company has not yet received the royalty statements for the first, second and third quarters of 2025 and therefore has not yet received the information needed to justify the recognition of royalty revenue for 2025.”

The company adds that discussions continue with mine management and external auditors but gives no timeline for the royalty payment. Elemental received $2.67 million from the 1% royalty in 2023.

The situation could also affect Endeavour. When the parties completed the sale agreement in August 2024, Endeavour secured a 3% royalty on the first 400,000 ounces sold by Wahgnion. The company valued expected receipts at 29.3 million as of July 2025. It has not indicated whether it has received any portion of this royalty.

Endeavour reported in its 2024 annual report that it had already received $50.2 million of the $60 million fixed consideration negotiated at the time of sale. However, no official data on Wahgnion’s production has been published since the mine’s acquisition.

In June 2025, BOAD announced a CFA10 billion financing package to support output at Wahgnion and Boungou, another gold mine the government purchased from Endeavour in August 2024.

This article was initially published in French by Emiliano Tossou

Adapted in English by Ange Jason Quenum

• Nigeria’s NIP ranks among the world’s largest real-time payment platforms, underscoring its central role in Africa’s economy and trade across it
• Africa’s real-time payments boom now fuels geopolitical rivalry as India, China, and Europe compete to shape the continent’s future digital infrastructure.
• Interoperability and currency fragmentation remain decisive challenges, determining whether Africa builds true continental rails or isolated payment islands

Africa is experiencing a pivotal moment in the evolution of its digital payments landscape. Between June 2024 and June 2025, the continent recorded the fastest expansion of instant payment systems (IPS) in its history. The State of Inclusive Instant Payment Systems in Africa 2025 report shows that five new domestic systems—Algeria’s Switch Mobile, Eswatini’s Fast Payment Module, Libya’s LYPay, Sierra Leone’s Salon Pement Switch, and Somalia’s SIPS—went live within just twelve months, raising the number of operational IPS from 31 to 36.

Since launching its instant payments platform in September 2025, the UEMOA region has added six new systems in little more than a year. Africa, long perceived as lagging behind more established regions, is now moving at a remarkable pace to close the digital payments gap. Moreover, on November 11, 2025, the East African Community launched a pilot initiative linking Rwanda and Tanzania to test a regional instant payment network. The pilot, conducted under the EAC Digital Integration Program, aims to lay the foundation for a cross-border real-time payments infrastructure spanning the region.

 It marked the first practical attempt to build a continental-scale real-time payment corridor, demonstrating not only the feasibility of instant transfers across sovereign borders but also the growing appetite among African blocs to reduce fragmentation and improve the speed, cost, and transparency of cross-border transactions.

Nigeria’s Dominance and a New Global Battle for Influence

Nigeria continues to dominate this accelerating landscape. Its NIBSS Instant Payment system (NIP) has grown into one of the world’s largest real-time payment platforms, processing 11 billion transactions in 2024, up from 2 billion in 2020. Transaction values surged from USD 457 billion to USD 1.1 trillion over the same period, underscoring the immense centrality of instant payments to Nigeria’s financial life.

NIP now serves nearly 58 million unique users—approximately half of the adult population—and in 2025 became the first African system to reach what SIIPS classifies as “mature inclusivity,” meeting strict thresholds for affordability, accessibility, governance transparency, and consumer protection. Nigeria’s trajectory places it on par with global pioneers such as India’s UPI and Brazil’s PIX, not only in scale but in national economic relevance.

Africa’s race toward real-time payments is no longer a purely domestic story; it has become a strategic field for geopolitical and technological competition. India, China, and Europe have all positioned themselves as partners—or contenders—seeking to supply the infrastructure, technologies, and standards that will underpin Africa’s payment future. India sees Africa as the natural next frontier for the UPI model, offering a low-cost digital public infrastructure template that many African central banks are interested in.

China, already deeply embedded in African fintech ecosystems, is strengthening its presence through hardware, QR payment standards, and large-scale digital infrastructure partnerships. Europe, for its part, brings decades of regulatory experience through SEPA and a mature ecosystem of instant payments technology vendors. For these global powers, Africa’s digital payments boom is not simply an export market; it is a space where influence over future economic and data architectures is at stake.

Interoperability, Currency Challenges

Beyond the technological race, the stakes for Africa itself are far more structural. Instant payments have become a critical enabler for the continent’s ambitious integration agenda. Seamless, affordable, and real-time digital transactions could support the expansion of intra-African trade, strengthen supply chains, and reduce the overwhelming reliance on cash that continues to constrain formal economic growth.

If successful, the expansion of IPS could help dismantle trade barriers, accelerate formalization, and provide small businesses and consumers with a unified, low-cost gateway to the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). But if this transition fails—if systems remain fragmented, unreliable, or too costly to use—Africa risks entrenching inefficiencies that would reinforce informal markets and create new digital borders even as physical borders open.

The question of interoperability lies at the heart of this tension. Africa’s payments landscape remains highly fragmented, with incompatible messaging standards, proprietary mobile money platforms, and parallel bank-led and telecom-led systems that rarely communicate seamlessly. While domestic IPS deployments have multiplied, meaningful cross-border interoperability remains rare. Only 11 systems on the continent currently support cross-border transactions, and most operate within narrow bilateral or regional corridors.

The SIIPS report highlights that technical interoperability—through ISO 20022 standards, API-based integrations, or regional switches—could drastically reduce transaction costs and unlock shared efficiencies, mirroring the experience of linked IPS networks in Asia and Europe. Without such coordination, Africa risks building a patchwork of sophisticated national systems that nevertheless fail to enable continental-scale economic activity.

The Stakes for African Integration

Yet even if interoperability is achieved, Africa will continue to grapple with a deeper structural challenge: its fragmented currency landscape. High FX spreads, volatility, and shallow currency markets drive up the cost of cross-border transfers regardless of how fast the underlying infrastructure becomes.

Even innovative systems like PAPSS must navigate the reality that instant settlement across dozens of currencies inherently carries financial frictions. In this respect, Africa’s challenge is not solely technological—it is macroeconomic. Until regional currency cooperation mechanisms emerge, real-time payments will not eliminate the high costs that burden African traders and consumers.

Despite these obstacles, the opportunities are seen as transformative. Africa is not merely catching up; it is redefining the frontier of inclusive digital payments. The unprecedented wave of IPS launches, the East African pilot, Nigeria’s leadership, and the global competition now unfolding around Africa’s payment infrastructures all signal a profound shift.

If Africa succeeds in building interconnected, affordable, and sustainable instant payment rails, it could emerge as the world’s largest integrated real-time payments zone—a catalyst for trade, financial inclusion, and economic modernization. If it fails, the continent risks creating 36 digital islands — advanced but isolated — unable to deliver on the promise of continental integration.

Idriss Linge

• Morocco’s Nador West Med port set to begin operations by end of 2026
• Facility to handle 35M tons annually; operated by Marsa Maroc and CMA CGM
• Project aims to boost investment, development in Nador region

The Nador West Med port complex in Morocco could begin operations by the end of 2026. The project was initially scheduled to open in 2027, according to local media reports citing Equipment and Water Minister Nizar Baraka during his presentation of the 2026 ministry budget.

“The port is ready. We are now moving into the operational phase with leading international partners,” the reports said. The project was built by a consortium made up of Morocco’s SGTM, Luxembourg-based JDN, and Turkey’s STFA.

The facility is expected to be operated jointly by Marsa Maroc and CMA CGM. It will include a terminal with 1,440 meters of berth and a depth of 18 meters, split between a 900-meter container section and a 540-meter general cargo section. The site covers 60 hectares and will eventually be equipped with eight ship-to-shore cranes, 24 rubber-tyred gantry cranes, and four mobile cranes.

Once fully operational, Nador West Med will be able to handle 25 million tons of hydrocarbons, 7 million tons of dry bulk, and 3 million tons of general cargo each year. Authorities say the complex will help narrow regional economic gaps and support development in the city of Nador, particularly by attracting foreign investment.

Henoc Dossa

For more than twenty years, Simandou has been presented as a project with the potential to boost Guinea's economic development significantly. As iron ore production gets underway, the government in Conakry must guarantee that the resulting revenues are effectively channeled toward poverty reduction and addressing inequality.

Guinea officially began mining operations at Simandou on Tuesday, November 11, developing one of the world’s largest undeveloped iron ore reserves. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) projects that the project could boost Guinea’s gross domestic product (GDP) by 26 percent by 2030 and double the value of the country's mineral exports.

These bold forecasts reflect how much the government in Conakry is counting on Simandou to transform the economy and bring prosperity, as shown by the ambitious "Simandou 2040" development program. While the revenue windfall from this resource could set a new course for one of the world’s poorest nations, disciplined management of funds will be essential for any genuine progress.

Corruption Report Dampens Enthusiasm

Excitement over the launch has been tempered by persistent concerns about Guinea's mineral governance, highlighted the day before the ceremony. In a report quoted by local media on Sunday, the National Transition Council (CNT) noted that a 100-million-dollar "entry ticket" fee paid by the Chinese steel group BAOWU to join the project has still not appeared in the public accounts.

These bold forecasts reflect how much the government in Conakry is counting on Simandou to transform the economy and bring prosperity, as shown by the ambitious "Simandou 2040" development program. 

"As part of efforts to boost administrative revenue collection, the CNT reiterates its call for the actual recovery of funds from BAOWU’s entry ticket into the Simandou project, estimated at 864 billion Guinean francs, and urges the relevant departments to ensure its regularization and transfer to the Public Treasury," stated the CNT’s Planning, Financial Affairs, and Budgetary Control Commission.

Bauxite Precedent Raises Red Flags

With Simandou, Guinea aims to disrupt the global hierarchy of iron producers. Conakry is targeting the premium market segment, as Simandou’s high-grade ore, grading 65 percent iron, could position the country as a key supplier for the low-carbon steel industry. Guinean Mines Minister Bouna Sylla said this unique characteristic would allow the country to secure "high prices" for Simandou iron.

Simandou is not Guinea’s first mineral resource of global importance. The country already hosts the world’s largest bauxite reserves, a potential that has recently made Guinea the world’s top exporter of the aluminum-producing ore. According to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), the bauxite sector accounted for 44 percent of mineral exports in 2022, while the mining sector overall contributed 20 percent to GDP, 17 percent to state revenue, and 6.5 percent of total employment.

Issues seen in the bauxite sector are likely to resurface in the Simandou revenue cycle. They include favoritism in fiscal annexes of key agreements, manipulation of export volumes and quality, mispricing through transfer pricing, collusion between mining companies and tax authorities to reduce tax adjustments, and political interference in tax audits.

However, bauxite exploitation has not yet brought major improvements to Guinea’s economic development. Despite average annual GDP growth exceeding 5.1 percent between 2019 and 2023, the poverty rate rose by seven percentage points during the same period, pushing an additional 1.8 million people into poverty.

A 2023 report on corruption in the Guinean mining sector, published by local civil society organizations, detailed numerous corruption risks undermining both the collection and management of mining revenues. Issues seen in the bauxite sector are likely to resurface in the Simandou revenue cycle. They include favoritism in fiscal annexes of key agreements, manipulation of export volumes and quality, mispricing through transfer pricing, collusion between mining companies and tax authorities to reduce tax adjustments, and political interference in tax audits.

These findings suggest that the structural weaknesses already visible in the bauxite sector could easily reappear with Simandou iron if deep reforms to mineral governance are not undertaken. In terms of transparency, authorities have yet to publish the agreement signed between the state and the companies involved in the Simandou project, 75 percent of which are Chinese-owned. The expected rise in public revenue without institutional reform does not guarantee better living conditions for the population. Instead, it risks entrenching predatory practices, fueling resource misallocation, and trapping Guinea in a new resource curse cycle where mineral abundance breeds economic fragility rather than development.

Charting a Path to Inclusive Growth

To avoid repeating past mistakes, Guinea has stated its intention to embed Simandou within a broader economic transformation strategy. This is the main ambition of the "Simandou 2040" program, presented by authorities as a national emergence plan designed to move beyond simple mineral extraction. The strategy aims for inclusive development that leverages natural resources while focusing on sustainable economic diversification.

International financial institutions, however, view this ambition with caution. The IMF believes Simandou can drive growth only if revenues are strategically reinvested. Its simulations show that using resources equivalent to 3 percent of GDP for public investment could accelerate non-mining growth, reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio more rapidly, and support employment.

Built around 122 projects and 36 reforms grouped under five pillars: agriculture and food industry, education, infrastructure and technology, the economy, and health, Simandou 2040 seeks to prevent the dissipation of mining revenues by channeling part of the proceeds toward productive sectors, human capital investment, and infrastructure capable of generating jobs and reducing poverty.

International financial institutions, however, view this ambition with caution. The IMF believes Simandou can drive growth only if revenues are strategically reinvested. Its simulations show that using resources equivalent to 3 percent of GDP for public investment could accelerate non-mining growth, reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio more rapidly, and support employment. The Fund warns that without targeted policy action, the project’s social impact would remain limited. Macroeconomic models suggest Simandou would lower the poverty rate by only 0.6 percentage points and could even increase inequality.

The World Bank offers a complementary perspective. It estimates that Simandou could raise Guinea’s revenue-to-GDP ratio to 17.3 percent by 2030, up from 12.8 percent in 2023, provided reforms are strengthened. Yet even that figure would remain below the 20 percent convergence target of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The Bank suggests that Simandou’s transformative effect will depend less on the ore itself than on the state’s capacity to convert mining income into productivity gains and job creation.

For all Guineans to benefit from the project’s expected returns, Conakry must ensure impeccable governance, transparent and disciplined revenue management, and investments that respond to the population’s real needs, especially in employment and basic infrastructure

Ultimately, the message emerging from both the Simandou 2040 program and the warnings of international institutions is clear. For all Guineans to benefit from the project’s expected returns, Conakry must ensure impeccable governance, transparent and disciplined revenue management, and investments that respond to the population’s real needs, especially in employment and basic infrastructure. Without such rigor, an influx of foreign currency could deepen the same imbalances seen during the bauxite boom, heighten social tensions, and reinforce dependence on a volatile resource rent instead of building the diversified economy the authorities aspire to create.

Emiliano Tossou

• Rwanda and Tanzania are linking their national payment systems—TIPS and RSWITCH—through a bilateral pilot.
• Sending money from Tanzania to Rwanda costs an average of 44.27% in Q1 2025, according to the World Bank—nearly seven times the global average of 6.49%.
• The initiative supports the EAC Cross-Border Payment System Masterplan and aims to reduce transaction costs and boost financial inclusion.

Rwanda and Tanzania have commenced bilateral discussions on technical modalities to link their national retail payment systems switches, in a move set to revolutionize cross-border money transfers across East Africa.

The initiative, which moved into its technical implementation phase at a high-level meeting in Kigali from November 10-14, will connect Tanzania's Instant Payment System (TIPS) with Rwanda's National Payment Switch (RSWITCH). Once operational, the linkage will allow individuals and businesses in both countries to send and receive money between bank accounts and mobile money wallets seamlessly and in real time.

"This preparatory work marks a pivotal milestone in our regional payment system integration agenda, moving us closer to a single regional instant payment ecosystem that will facilitate secure, affordable, and real-time transactions across borders," said Eng. Daniel Murenzi, EAC Principal Information Technology Officer.

Fabian Ladislaus Kasole, Assistant Manager, Oversight and Policy, at the National Payments Directorate of the Bank of Tanzania, reaffirmed the collective commitment. "As a region, we remain committed to establishing a robust technical and operational framework that will ensure the successful interlinking of our national retail payment systems, ultimately enhancing cross-border payment efficiency and financial inclusion across the region."

The integration of Tanzania's TIPS and Rwanda's RSWITCH forms the core of a strategic Proof of Concept pilot. This pilot is designed to demonstrate the technical and operational feasibility of a direct, functional cross-border payment switch within the EAC. The bilateral Tanzania-Rwanda model serves as a pioneering model for future expansion to all EAC Partner States.

The ongoing technical preparations for the interlinking represent the first tangible implementation of the EAC Cross-Border Payment System Masterplan and directly support the aspirations of the EAC Heads of State for deeper regional financial integration.

Staggering remittance costs across the region underscore the urgency of this integration. According to the World Bank’s Remittance Prices Worldwide data, as of Q1 2025, it cost an average of 44.27% of the amount sent to transfer money from Tanzania to Rwanda—a figure that dwarfs the global average of 6.49%. Such exorbitant fees not only burden individuals and small businesses but also hinder regional trade, financial inclusion, and economic mobility. By enabling direct, real-time transfers, the TIPS–RSWITCH linkage is expected to facilitate affordable cross-border transfers within the region.

Hikmatu Bilali

• Cameroon's parliament has been called to ratify a January 2025 aviation agreement that positions the country as Qatar Airways' first direct CEMAC destination.
• Currently, Cameroon-Doha flights require connections via Rwanda, Ivory Coast, or Morocco; ratification will grant unlimited traffic rights for direct commercial services.
• The agreement challenges Ethiopian Airlines' dominance across Central Africa and could transform Camair-Co into a regional feeder airline for Qatar Airways' expanding network.

Cameroon is racing toward a landmark aviation milestone as its parliament prepares to ratify a bilateral air services agreement that would position the country as Qatar Airways' first direct destination in the CEMAC region, ending longtime reliance on circuitous connections and challenging Ethiopian Airlines' dominance over Central African routes to the Middle East and Asia.

The Cameroonian government has accelerated parliamentary procedures to ratify the January 2025 air services agreement, according to Investir au Cameroun. The bill, submitted for approval, signals Doha's strategic push to capture a market long underserved by direct links to the Gulf. The agreement, signed in January 2025 by Transport Minister Jean Ernest Masséna Ngallé Bibehe and his Qatari counterpart, Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulla Al Thani, establishes unlimited, unrestricted traffic rights for passenger and cargo flights between the two territories.

The ratification would revolutionize travel patterns from Cameroon and neighboring states. Presently, passengers flying from Douala or Yaoundé to Doha must navigate complex, multi-stop itineraries via Kigali with code-sharing arrangements with RwandAir, via Abidjan with Air Côte d'Ivoire, or via Casablanca with Royal Air Maroc. The situation is even more acute for Gabonese travelers. Libreville-Doha connections currently rely entirely on Royal Air Maroc, leveraging Morocco's visa facilitation agreements with Gabon. This workaround underscores the absence of direct Gulf carriers in the sub-region.

Should the law pass, Cameroon would gain its first-ever direct air link to the Middle East and Asia, instantly becoming a competitive alternative to Addis Ababa's Bole International Airport. Ethiopian Airlines has long monopolized Central Africa's eastward connections, capturing premium business and diplomatic traffic. Qatar Airways' entry via Douala would disrupt this dominance, offering travelers seamless connections through Doha's Hamad International Airport – a central hub for Asia-Pacific, Europe, and the Americas.

opportunities ahead

The agreement also opens the door for Camair-Co's evolution from a domestic operator to a regional player. During the January 2025 signing ceremony, executives from both carriers discussed opportunities for commercial and technical cooperation. While no formal partnership has been announced, industry sources suggest Qatar Airways could leverage Camair-Co's regional network and Douala's geographic advantages to feed traffic from the Central African Republic, Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, and Equatorial Guinea – all CEMAC members lacking direct Gulf connections.

The move aligns with Qatar Airways' aggressive African expansion strategy. The carrier currently serves 31 cities across the continent, offering either direct flights or connections via Doha that link African markets to one another and to the world. The Cameroonian route would fill a critical gap in its Central African portfolio, which currently only includes Kinshasa (DRC) as a direct destination in the broader region.

For cash-strapped Cameroon, the stakes extend beyond connectivity.

The government sees Qatar Airways' arrival as a revenue booster, with increased airport taxes, tourism potential, and enhanced cargo capacity for agricultural exports to Gulf and Asian markets. With parliamentary ratification imminent, Yaoundé is poised to become Doha's premier gateway to CEMAC. This strategic pivot could redraw Central Africa's aviation map and loosen Ethiopian Airlines' grip on the region's most lucrative eastward corridors.

Idriss Linge