At the start of 2025, many expected a standoff between Niamey and China National Petroleum Corporation Niger Petroleum (CNPCNP), similar to recent disputes in Burkina Faso and Mali’s mining industries. Following the expulsion of Chinese executives and Niger’s push for stricter local content rules, a confrontation seemed inevitable. Yet operations and exports have continued uninterrupted, generating over $2 billion in revenue.

By late October, calm prevails, even as behind-the-scenes talks continue. The question remains why Niamey is avoiding a direct clash with its Chinese partner, despite the high stakes.

In recent years, members of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) have adopted tougher stances toward foreign investors in extractive sectors. Burkina Faso nationalized certain industrial gold mines and increased the state’s share in new projects. Mali passed legislation reinforcing national sovereignty over resources, allowing the state and local investors to hold up to 35% of mining companies.

A cautious approach shaped by oil dependence

Niger’s restraint stems primarily from its deep economic reliance on oil revenues. In April 2024, CNPC advanced $400 million to Niamey against future crude sales, repayable over twelve months, to support spending on security, agriculture, and healthcare. The loan offered critical relief for a country still recovering from ECOWAS sanctions imposed after the July 2023 coup.

According to the World Bank, Niger’s economy grew by 8.4% in 2024, up from 2% in 2023, driven by large-scale oil exports. Maintaining export flows is vital for public finances, salaries, and essential services.

CNPCNP holds 65% of the Agadem oilfield and has invested over $5 billion to develop the site, build supporting infrastructure, and construct the 1,950 km pipeline to Cotonou. The pipeline provides Niger’s only direct access to the sea and global markets. However, with control centered in Beijing and the infrastructure relying on complex technologies, Niamey’s room for maneuver remains narrow. The SORAZ refinery, which supplies the domestic market and is also Chinese-managed, illustrates this dependence.

In early 2025, Niamey called for an opening of WAPCO’s capital — the company managing the pipeline segment — acknowledging the fragility of its position.

At the same time, the government set ambitious local content targets, requiring 80% of project staff to be nationals and demanding fairer pay scales. Currently, only 30% of employees are Nigerien. The lack of technical expertise, often cited by the Chinese side, makes these goals difficult to achieve in the short term.

These demands also carry social and political weight: citizens expect visible benefits in jobs and skills transfer. For now, Niamey’s caution reflects economic pragmatism more than diplomatic restraint. Breaking ties with CNPCNP would be too costly for public finances, even as the government seeks to assert sovereignty while maintaining production stability.

Firmness when leverage allows it

Niger has shown greater resolve where it holds the upper hand. In June 2025, the military government nationalized Somaïr, a subsidiary of French uranium giant Orano, after the company acknowledged losing operational control of the mine in December 2024. Despite Orano’s objections and two arbitration cases before ICSID, Niamey assumed the legal risk, convinced it had sufficient leverage.

The oil sector, however, presents a different reality. With a single investor, critical infrastructure, and heavy technological dependence, Niger’s ability to act is limited. This imbalance explains Niamey’s restraint toward Beijing.

Niger’s experience mirrors a broader trend across Africa: governments are reclaiming control over natural resources, but their success depends on the depth of foreign investment, technological autonomy, and infrastructure complexity.

The open question is how far Niamey can go in asserting its sovereignty. The junta has shown political will, yet its reliance on CNPCNP constrains its options. By contrast, the bolder uranium strategy may serve as a model for other countries in the region seeking to rebalance power in strategic sectors.