• Cameroon cocoa output faces 10% drop as black pod disease and counterfeit fungicides spread.
• Ghost town lockdowns and Telcar’s suspension deepen supply shocks, hurting farmers and grinders.
• Futures near $7,364/ton; volatility rises as Cameroon’s shortfall magnifies West African cocoa risks.

Cameroon’s cocoa industry, the world’s fourth-largest, is facing a compounding crisis that combines disease, insecurity, and corporate pullback. The sector generates over CFA 359 billion (about USD 595 million) from 180,095 tons in the first half of 2024/25 and sustains nearly one million people, but output is under acute pressure. National production, commonly ranging from 250,000 to 290,000 tons, is expected to contract by at least 10% this season, with the South-West region, the supplier of nearly half the crop, being hit hardest.

The first blow is biological. Heavy rains since July 2025, topping 2,200 mm in the South-West, have triggered a surge in black pod disease (Phytophthora megakarya). Infection rates of 65–70% have been reported in key districts such as Muyuka and Kumba. Counterfeit fungicides undermine farmers’ efforts to contain the outbreak, as many are smuggled across the Nigerian border. The result is pod losses ranging from 30% to as high as 90% on some farms, eroding both quality and volume simultaneously.

Layered on top is insecurity. The Anglophone conflict has entrenched “ghost town” lockdowns in the South-West and North-West, enforced by separatist groups. On these days, all economic activity halts, and farmers risk ambush if they attempt to reach plantations. A recent one-month lockdown disrupted government field inspections and fungicide quality checks, worsening the spread of disease. Historically, these ghost towns have cut cocoa sales from the South-West by as much as 40%, and 2025 has seen their persistence alongside sporadic clashes and extortion on rural roads.

Corporate retrenchment adds another dimension. Telcar Cocoa Ltd., which once handled up to 40% of the nation's beans, suspended processing operations in mid-September, citing a “bean quality crisis.” The move follows Telcar’s earlier split with Cargill and reflects both the deterioration of crop quality and the logistical disruptions caused by ghost towns. By withdrawing, Telcar reduces domestic processing capacity, pushes more beans onto spot markets, and signals growing uncertainty to investors. The suspension also deprives farmers and small grinders of a key buyer, deepening income losses.

The mechanics of the crisis show a classic supply shock in a commodity with inelastic short-term output. Farmers cannot quickly expand acreage or replace diseased trees. With fewer beans being moved to market, prices rise. At the same time, ghost towns and insecurity impose frictional costs: shipments are delayed, storage risks rise, and smuggling surges. For small grinders, the effect is severe — input costs can increase 20–30%, throughput is disrupted, and margins are compressed by as much as 70%. Many risk closure without relief.

Global markets are already feeling the ripples. Futures on ICE were trading at USD 7,364 per ton on September 17, down slightly on the day but vulnerable to upward spikes. Cameroon’s potential 25,000–40,000-ton shortfall alone cannot overturn global supply dynamics dominated by Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana, yet in a context of regional weather shocks and political volatility, it magnifies uncertainty. Price volatility in Q3 has already risen above 7%, and Telcar’s exit will feed risk premiums in forward contracts.

Policy and commercial responses are lagging. Government inspection programs remain hampered by insecurity, while fungicide certification and distribution channels are too porous to prevent the penetration of counterfeit products. Extension services are restricted, and there is no adequate insurance or risk-sharing mechanism for grinders. Without rapid action, production in 2025/26 could contract by 15–25%, resulting in sustained high local prices (4,000–6,000 CFA/kg) and hollowing out processing activity and rural incomes.

The crisis is a test of resilience for Cameroon’s cocoa economy. Farmers require secure corridors to access plantations and reliable fungicide supply chains. Small grinders need cooperative mechanisms and hedging tools to manage volatility. For investors, the message is twofold: the near-term opportunity lies in long positions on West African cocoa, but the long-term risk is systemic — without integrated solutions that tackle both disease and insecurity, Cameroon’s comparative advantage in premium-quality cocoa could erode irreversibly.

Mercy Fosoh