The report urges project stakeholders to shift away from a limited extract-and-export approach to critical minerals, which often stems from geopolitical rivalries among major powers. Instead, it recommends transforming the project into a deeply integrated logistics platform that both shapes the regions it crosses and aligns with the needs of local economies.

Announcements about financing for the Lobito Corridor are increasing, with many public and private entities involved. However, a new report highlights that significant technical, political, and social obstacles threaten the completion of this cross-border infrastructure project. The report, published Monday, June 23, 2025, by the French Institute for International and Strategic Affairs (IRIS), notes that the corridor also intensifies geopolitical rivalries among major powers seeking critical minerals.

The IRIS report, titled "Les obstacles subsistant à la réalisation du corridor de Lobito," confirms that the Africa Finance Corporation (AFC) stated in May 2025 the corridor would reach financial close by the end of 2026. This project aims to connect copper and cobalt mines in southern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and northwestern Zambia to global markets through Angola's Lobito port. The AFC's announcement followed the launch of the "Lobito Corridor Impact Development" (LCID) platform. This platform, supported by the Angolan Sovereign Wealth Fund (FSDEA) and Israeli entrepreneur Haim Taib, launched with $100 million in initial capital toward a goal of $1 billion, energycapitalpower.com reported.

The U.S. Development Finance Corporation (DFC) and the African Development Bank (AfDB) have also reinforced their commitment, pledging a combined $1.05 billion. The European Union continues to prioritize the Lobito Corridor within its Global Gateway initiative, signaling increased financial and technical support.

The presence of multiple donors presents the first major challenge for the Lobito Corridor. This involves overlapping procedures, distinct compliance requirements, and often significant implementation delays. Transforming these commitments into actual disbursements remains uncertain, a trend observed in other African infrastructure projects. For instance, the Grand Inga hydroelectric project in the DRC has been stalled for years due to political disagreements and a lack of inter-institutional coordination, despite past World Bank support. Similarly, Kenya's Lake Turkana wind farm experienced years of delays after some public donors withdrew.

Regulatory inconsistencies among Angola, Zambia, and the DRC also hinder the corridor's progress. Differences in customs, tariff regimes, technical standards, and transit procedures highlight a lack of regional regulatory unification. This is particularly problematic for "development" corridors, which require two-way logistical fluidity. Such corridors not only facilitate the export of raw materials but also the delivery of goods, services, and added value both upstream and downstream.

Security along railway lines and in copper mining areas in Angola presents a third significant challenge. Angola's long civil war (1975–2002) left widespread physical damage, including destroyed rails, booby-trapped tunnels, and areas inaccessible due to unexploded ordnance. Chinese companies, which began an initial rehabilitation of the line in the early 2010s, deliberately bypassed the riskiest areas due to the lack of comprehensive minefield mapping from the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola rebels. This prioritization of speed over thoroughness means certain strategic sections were never integrated into the operational network. Consequently, the transport of heavy minerals like copper remains extremely limited due to unreliable logistics.

Infrastructure Deficiencies and External Influences

Further complicating matters, logistical, port, and intermodal infrastructures face structural delays. Some parts of Lobito port, intended to be central to the corridor's value chain, have not received promised modernizations. Quay extensions, heavy handling facilities, and digital port flow management systems are either unfinished or still in planning stages. Additionally, several secondary logistics hubs planned in locations such as Huambo, Luau, and Chingola remain in the planning phase. These delays risk confining the Lobito Corridor to merely extracting and evacuating minerals, rather than transforming it into a tool for regional integration that stimulates local economies, including production areas, domestic markets, and agricultural or industrial small and medium-sized enterprises.

The uncertain and potentially destabilizing regional political environment poses another major obstacle. Zambia is entering a pre-election period, which brings uncertainties regarding administrative continuity and budgetary priorities. Angola also faces general elections in 2027, which could shift internal power dynamics and influence economic decisions concerning the corridor. In the DRC, persistent instability in the East, fueled by armed conflicts, territorial claims, and weak central authority, continues to erode investor confidence. Beyond these national dynamics, the fundamental lack of regional political integration undermines the project. Currently, there is no robust institutional framework for the joint governance of the corridor or any supranational mechanism for sustainable strategic coordination.

Furthermore, Zambia's close historical and financial ties to China, its primary bilateral creditor and a dominant player in the mining sector, are raising concerns among Western donors. This could potentially hinder strategic alignment around the corridor.

The possibility of Donald Trump's return to the White House also casts a shadow over the continuity of U.S. engagement with the project. Proposals for bilateral partnerships have already been made to the DRC, involving agreements for critical mineral supply in exchange for targeted financing of transport or processing infrastructure. These offers, sometimes called "American-style deals," suggest a more utilitarian and bilateral approach to engagement, contrasting with the multilateral strategies initially promoted by the Biden administration.

On another front, the report emphasizes that the corridor's realization risks generating social tensions. According to International Finance Corporation (IFC) requirements, any population displacement or land acquisition must adhere to strict procedures for consultation, compensation, and resettlement. However, these standards are not fully applied or institutionally framed in several rural areas of Zambia and the DRC. The complexity of land tenure, where customary rights and formal titles coexist, creates legal uncertainties in the process.

In light of these various challenges, the report recommends viewing the Lobito Corridor not as a geopolitical tool projected by Washington, Brussels, or Beijing. Instead, it suggests treating it as a public infrastructure with shared governance, rooted in the needs of local populations and the real capacities of states to take ownership of the project.

Written in French by Walid Kéfi,

Translated and adapted into English by Mouka Mezonlin