• The US, DRC and Rwanda sign a new framework tying mineral access, governance reforms and security cooperation into one strategic agreement.

• The deal formalises supply chains, strengthens Kinshasa’s control over eastern minerals, and creates a US-backed alternative to China’s dominance.

• Implementation depends on improved security in eastern DRC; continued instability could undermine the framework’s economic and strategic objectives.

The United States, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Rwanda have signed a new cooperation framework in Washington that redefines how critical minerals and regional security will be managed. The set of agreements, built around the Regional Economic Integration Framework (REIF/CIER) and two Strategic Partnership Agreements (SPAs) between Washington and each of the two African governments, establishes a system in which mineral access, governance reforms, and security commitments are formally connected. It is the first time the United States has linked defence collaboration, supply chain oversight, and resource extraction into a single policy structure for Central Africa.

The new framework aims to formalise the mineral economy and reduce the influence of informal channels that have historically shaped extraction in eastern DRC. By requiring that access to mining zones be negotiated directly with Kinshasa, the agreements seek to limit the financial flows to armed groups that have long benefited from parallel networks. Congolese authorities emphasise that this shift strengthens state authority in the region while improving the predictability and legality of mineral exports. For the United States, it provides a more straightforward pathway for securing stable supplies of cobalt, copper, tungsten, and other strategic resources that feed its industrial and technological sectors.

The SPAs go beyond traditional investment treaties by integrating governance benchmarks and defence cooperation. They formalise Washington's role in supporting security sector reforms in both the DRC and Rwanda. In return, American firms obtain a more transparent and regulated environment for investment in mining operations and related infrastructure. This approach aligns security incentives with economic interests, positioning the United States as a stabilising actor in a region whose mineral output is essential to global supply chains.

Private-sector participation is already visible in the operational rollout of the framework. The recent shipment of tungsten concentrate from Rwanda’s Nyakabingo mine to a refinery in Pennsylvania illustrates the traceable and legally formalised supply chain the United States intends to scale. Companies such as KoBold Metals and Starlink are being integrated into broader infrastructure efforts, including the development of the Lobito Corridor, which is expected to become a major export route for minerals from Central Africa to Atlantic ports. These initiatives reflect Washington’s strategy of combining industrial investment with geopolitical positioning.

The agreement also introduces a competitive alternative to China’s dominant presence in the DRC’s cobalt and copper belts. By embedding transparency requirements, traceability systems, and security guarantees, the United States is constructing a supply chain architecture that may limit the operational room for Chinese companies unable or unwilling to meet the new standards. This adds a strategic dimension to what has traditionally been an economic rivalry.

Other actors are also affected. Saudi Arabia, which seeks to develop a global mineral processing platform through Manara Minerals, could face reduced influence if direct export routes to the United States become the norm. The European Union’s regulatory-driven approach appears slower than that of the United States and risks leaving Europe downstream in the materials cycle, with materials circulated through American-controlled channels. Japan, already engaged in the Lobito Corridor through JOGMEC, is well-positioned to align its strategy with the new framework.

The principal uncertainty remains security conditions in eastern DRC. The REIF model assumes that formalised mineral governance will reduce the incentives for armed groups and encourage coordinated action between Kinshasa and Kigali. However, recent fighting in South Kivu underscores that instability persists. If violence continues, it could undermine the logistical and political foundations of the new supply chain architecture and present operational risks for both companies and governments.

Overall, the Washington agreements represent a coordinated effort by the United States to redesign the critical minerals landscape of Central Africa through governance reforms, security commitments, and industrial partnerships. They introduce a new competitive environment for global powers engaged in the mineral economy and redefine access to some of the world’s most important resources. Their success will depend on the extent to which regional security improves and on the participating states upholding the implementation mechanisms the framework requires.

Idriss Linge, With Bankable Africa