• The US–RDC–Rwanda accords mark a shift from conflict diplomacy to engineered control of critical minerals.
• Washington aims to counter China by securing future cobalt and copper flows through a new Atlantic corridor.
• RDC hopes for industrialisation, but chemical supply gaps and slow US financing threaten the strategy.

Signed on 4 December 2025 in Washington, the new accords linking the United States, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Rwanda extend far beyond a diplomatic gesture. They represent a deliberate geoeconomic reconfiguration: an attempt by Washington to reduce China’s entrenched dominance in cobalt and copper, while anchoring Europe into a US-led critical-minerals architecture. For the DRC, they also offer the possibility of negotiating from a position of renewed strategic relevance.

A New Geoeconomic Architecture Taking Shape

The US move is explicitly tied to timing. China currently refines about 80% of global cobalt and controls or finances a significant portion of Congolese mineral production. Yet many Chinese mining contracts in the DRC will expire between 2028 and 2034. Anticipating this, the accords establish “Strategic Partnerships” and a Strategic Asset Reserve—mechanisms enabling Western companies to secure priority access to future large-scale deposits not yet allocated. This aligns with Washington’s broader industrial policy, which aims to secure inputs for batteries, clean energy, and defence technologies.

Reorienting mineral flows is central to this effort. Until now, cobalt and copper have moved primarily eastward toward Asian refineries. The US-backed Lobito Corridor proposes an alternative route, sending Congolese and Zambian output westward through Angola to the Atlantic. Europe has already signalled its alignment by committing financing, not wanting to be excluded from a supply chain increasingly shaped by US strategic priorities. Yet the corridor crosses more than 1,300 km of territory where security remains volatile, making the logistics vulnerable to sabotage and political tension.

For Kinshasa, the promise of industrialisation is a crucial component of the deal. The government insists that minerals be processed on Congolese soil rather than exported in raw form. But the technical reality complicates this ambition: Congo imports nearly all the sulfuric acid and chemical reagents needed for refining—and these inputs come overwhelmingly from China, the very actor Washington seeks to displace. Without local chemical production, any US-backed refineries risk remaining dependent on Chinese supply chains, limiting the transformative impact of the accords. Moreover, US development financing, primarily through the DFC, is known to move more slowly than Chinese funding, which can create frustration if early results lag.

The accords also aim to strengthen state sovereignty in a sector long undermined by informality and armed groups. By pledging to formalise artisanal mining and disrupt smuggling networks, the US and the DRC hope to cut financial channels that fuel instability. But this shift carries social risks: thousands of artisanal miners depend on informal extraction for livelihoods. A transition that excludes them without viable alternatives could generate new tensions and even undermine security objectives.

Rwanda’s inclusion adds another layer of complexity. While the accords position Kigali as a partner in stabilising regional trade, they also formalise its role as a logistical and political interface with Western partners. This strengthens US influence but does not automatically resolve the deep structural causes of the RDC–Rwanda tensions, leaving peace fragile despite diplomatic signatures.

In the end, these agreements redraw the strategic map. On one side, an emerging Atlantic axis—US, EU, Angola, and the DRC—seeks to build a supply chain insulated from Chinese control. On the other hand, China still dominates refining capacity and the global chemical inputs necessary for processing. The DRC stands at the centre of this contest, hoping to turn great-power competition into industrial investment, greater sovereignty, and long-delayed development—though none of these outcomes are guaranteed.