Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso have not been members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) since early January, but their political withdrawal has not resulted in a full break with the bloc’s institutional framework. At its 68th session, ECOWAS confirmed the continuation of institutional ties with the three Sahelian states.

The announced withdrawal of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has not led to a complete break with West Africa’s regional institutional framework. Beyond the sovereignty-driven rhetoric and geopolitical realignment promoted by the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), recent decisions point to a more calibrated approach, marked by the selective preservation of ties with regional institutions considered economically and strategically indispensable.

This dynamic is illustrated by the recent decision of the ECOWAS Authority  of Heads of State and Government concerning the Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA).

Membership requested by AES states

Rather than a unilateral accommodation by ECOWAS, the official communiqué makes clear that the initiative originated with the AES countries themselves, following a formal request for continued participation in GIABA.

“The Conference grants Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger the status of non-ECEDOWAS members of the GIABA, based on their strong political commitment to fully implement all obligations required by GIABA members,” the decision adopted by heads of state states.

The wording underscores that, despite their withdrawal from the ECOWAS political framework, the three Sahelian countries sought to remain embedded in a core regional mechanism dedicated to combating money laundering, terrorist financing and the financing of the proliferation of weapons.

According to the communiqué, this commitment includes the correction of identified weaknesses in their anti-money laundering, counter-terrorist financing and counter-proliferation financing (AML/CFT/CPF) systems, as well as full cooperation and compliance with all related obligations. In practice, this implies continued adherence to binding regional and international standards aligned with the requirements of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).

Such compliance is critical in a context where the credibility of AML/CFT frameworks directly affects access to external financing, correspondent banking relationships and international capital markets.

The decision reflects a pragmatic economic assessment. In economies already strained by persistent security challenges, fiscal pressure and limited access to concessional financing, a full disengagement from regional financial and regulatory cooperation mechanisms would significantly increase the risk of financial isolation. By maintaining their anchoring within GIABA, the AES countries aim to preserve a degree of regulatory continuity beyond their political disengagement from ECOWAS.

EBID: non-regional membership maintained

A similar logic applies to the treatment of the ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development (EBID). The Authority approved a resolution adopted by the bank’s Board of Governors allowing Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger to continue participating in the institution as non-regional members, while also endorsing the retention of staff from these countries within the bank.

The move is intended to avoid a sudden disruption of the regional development finance architecture and to safeguard existing financial commitments.

Together, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger hold 6.29% of EBID’s capital. As of the end of June 2025, the bank had invested more than $5 billion across the region. While the combined shareholding of the three countries remains modest compared with major contributors such as Nigeria (31.2%), Ghana (15.71%) and Côte d’Ivoire (14.76%), they have nonetheless benefited from substantial financing for large-scale infrastructure projects.

The Samendeni dam funded by the EBID in Burkina Faso

In Burkina Faso, EBID supported the construction of the Samendeni dam and hydroelectric power plant, as well as the new Donsin international airport project, through a loan of 5 billion CFA francs (more than $8 million) granted in 2013. In Mali, the bank intervened in the development of the Taoussa dam, while in Niger it participated in the financing of the Kandadji dam project.

Over the longer term, however, the formal withdrawal of the AES countries from ECOWAS could prompt a reconfiguration of EBID’s capital structure and a reassessment of its investment priorities. Maintaining non-regional member status therefore appears to be a transitional arrangement, preserving financial continuity while leaving open the question of the institution’s future balance. This comes as the AES has recently completed the legal establishment of its own investment bank.

Taken together, these decisions point to a pragmatic reordering of relations between the AES and ECOWAS. While the political authority of the regional bloc is being openly challenged, this contestation is not accompanied by a rejection of the economic and financial norms that underpin West Africa’s regional integration. By seeking to remain within GIABA and by retaining a role in EBID, the Sahelian states implicitly acknowledge that certain regional institutions now operate according to a quasi-multilateral logic that is difficult to replicate or replace. The outcome highlights the practical limits of a total rupture in a region characterised by deep financial and security interdependencies.

Moutiou Adjibi Nourou