IRIS notes that the TAZARA corridor is emerging as a direct rival to Lobito. In addition to a full rehabilitation planned within three years, the line linking Zambia’s Copperbelt to the port of Dar es Salaam already benefits from an established institutional framework and proven operational experience. These advantages strengthen its appeal at a time when the Lobito Corridor remains under construction and lacks a formal cross-border governance structure.

The Lobito Corridor, presented as a major trade route linking Angola's Lobito port to the mining regions of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Zambia, is facing hesitation from regional economic players. According to a report published Monday by the French Institute of International and Strategic Relations (IRIS), uncertainty over the project’s business model, the lack of a cross-border governance authority, and delays on the Zambian section of the line are the main reasons behind this cautious approach.

Titled “Géoéconomie locale du corridor de Lobito : mesurer l’impact réel pour les acteurs économiques,” the report also outlines the historical foundations of the corridor. It recalls that the route dates back to the early 20th century, when the Benguela railway connected copper and cobalt mines in the African interior to the Atlantic port of Lobito.

The line served as a central economic artery for decades until Angola’s civil war forced its closure. After the end of hostilities in the early 2000s, a Chinese company rebuilt the 1,300-kilometre (808-mile) section between Lobito and Luau near the DRC border, paving the way for the current concession.

Private Sector Drives Revival

More recently, the private sector has driven a more ambitious relaunch of the project. In 2022, the Angolan government signed a 30-year concession with the Lobito Atlantic Railways (LAR) consortium, which brings together commodity trader Trafigura, rail operator Vecturis and Portuguese construction group Mota Engil. Under this agreement, LAR has committed to invest 550 million dollars to modernize infrastructure and operate the corridor.

This private capital is combined with significant public backing. The project enjoys support from several other funders, including the United States, the European Union and the African Development Bank. Taken together, the cross-border infrastructure program now represents more than 10 billion dollars in investment commitments from both public and private sources.

Despite these commitments, miners in the DRC's Katanga province and Zambia's Copperbelt still rely on existing export options. Their main routes remain the TAZARA (Tanzania Zambia Railway Authority) line, as well as overland corridors to the ports of Durban in South Africa, Beira in Mozambique and Dar es Salaam in Tanzania.

One key reason for this is that the Zambian section of the Lobito Corridor remains at the planning stage. Zambian Minister of Transport and Logistics Frank Tayali recently indicated that construction on the "Jimbe Chingola" section may begin in the third quarter of 2026, with financing still under negotiation. Until that section is actually built, Lobito remains more a theoretical possibility than a concrete solution for Zambian operators.

As a result, major mining companies such as Kansanshi, Sentinel, Lumwana, Lubambe and Mopani have not announced any specific export plans via Lobito. Instead, they continue to route their production through established corridors to Dar es Salaam and Durban, which already form part of their logistical routines.

According to the IRIS report, the corridor is only really taking shape on the DRC side. In 2024, the Kamoa Kakula mine, operated by Canadian firm Ivanhoe Mines together with its Chinese partner Zijin Mining, signed a capacity agreement with the LAR consortium to ship between 120,000 and 240,000 tons of copper each year

According to the IRIS report, the corridor is only really taking shape on the DRC side. In 2024, the Kamoa Kakula mine, operated by Canadian firm Ivanhoe Mines together with its Chinese partner Zijin Mining, signed a capacity agreement with the LAR consortium to ship between 120,000 and 240,000 tons of copper each year. A test shipment of copper concentrate carried out in late 2023 reached Lobito port in eight days. In parallel, Trafigura, which is part of the consortium, has signed long term logistics agreements to move copper through the corridor.

However, no other major mining operator in the DRC has officially committed to the route. Chinese firms, which dominate regional production, continue for the time being to use corridors leading to the Indian Ocean, where their logistics chains and port partnerships are already in place. This situation leaves the corridor highly dependent on a single large operator, Kamoa Kakula. In the absence of volume diversification and firm commitments from other major producers, the report concludes that the project’s economic model remains fragile.

The Lobito route does, however, offer clear logistical gains where it is operational. These advantages are currently concentrated in Congolese territory. For Kamoa Kakula, the time saving is significant, with an eight-day journey to Lobito compared to a minimum of 25 days by road to Durban or Dar es Salaam, according to Ivanhoe.

Governance Vacuum and Chinese Influence

On the Zambian side, the lack of transparent cost data further slows decision-making. No public figures are yet available to quantify potential savings on fuel, handling, insurance or cargo losses. Because there is no published cost per ton schedule, the real economic impact of using Lobito cannot be calculated, which prevents companies from integrating the corridor into their financial models.

Caution among local economic actors is also linked to geopolitical considerations. Many perceive the Lobito Corridor as a Western-backed project that could complicate relations with China, which holds a dominant position in the Congolese mining sector. Of the 19 main copper mines in Katanga, 15 are operated or majority funded by Chinese conglomerates.

It is much simpler to do business with the Chinese. We will not use a Western-linked project if it compromises our business relationship with China

"It is much simpler to do business with the Chinese. We will not use a Western-linked project if it compromises our business relationship with China," one sector player in Lubumbashi was quoted as saying in the report.

For IRIS, Chinese operators are likely to adopt the corridor if it proves more competitive on cost and reliability. In practice, China is already indirectly involved. It has supplied rolling stock, participated in the rebuilding of the Benguela line and remains one of the principal anticipated users, given its leading role in purchasing and refining exported minerals.

Beyond financing and commercial choices, the Lobito project also faces a structural governance challenge. It brings together three countries that use different administrative languages and legal systems, yet it still lacks a formal coordination body or dedicated transnational public authority. This absence of a tripartite steering structure makes it harder to develop a shared vision and slows efforts to define uniform rules for economic operators along the corridor.

By contrast, the TAZARA corridor, which crosses two Anglophone countries, Zambia and Tanzania, benefits from an existing institutional framework and decades of operational experience. In late September, China signed a 1.4 billion dollar agreement with Lusaka and Dodoma for the complete rehabilitation of TAZARA, with the aim of achieving full operational status within three years. As a result, TAZARA is emerging as a direct logistical competitor that is expected to be fully operational ahead of Lobito and is perceived by many economic actors as the less risky option.

TAZARA is emerging as a direct logistical competitor that is expected to be fully operational ahead of Lobito and is perceived by many economic actors as the less risky option.

In the longer term, the Lobito Corridor could nevertheless support the creation of refining hubs or industrial zones in locations such as Chingola, Luau and Huambo. These sites could bring refining and processing activities closer to mining areas. To reach that point, however, the report stresses that governments will need to introduce incentive policies, including attractive taxation, a clear environmental framework and reliable electricity connections.

Walid Kéfi