• The disarmament and demobilisation programme launched in August 2025 is projected to cost between 50 and 100 million dollars, a heavy burden for the Central African Republic.
• Economic forecasts hinge on sustained calm; the IMF expects growth to rise from 1.9 percent in 2024 to 3 percent in 2025 if violence stays low.
• The presidential, legislative and local elections scheduled for 28 December 2025 will decide whether the costly peace process turns into lasting stability.

Disarmament and demobilization, which started this August at the Maloum site 55 kilometers from Bambari, have a clear cost. Each ex-combatant incurs expenses: cantonment allowances, cash payments, medical care, and psychosocial support. Additionally, there are costs for transporting and securely storing weapons collected by MINUSCA and their controlled destruction.

The professional training and economic reintegration programs that follow represent the largest portion of the expenses. According to donor estimates, the total Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) process in the Central African Republic will cost between 50 and 100 million dollars. In a country where 80% of the national budget depends on external aid and public debt exceeds 60% of GDP, this financial load is significant.

However, the gamble can still be justified on economic grounds. The immediate drop in violence improves security for trade routes, reducing supply-chain interruptions and lowering risk premiums for haulers. Agriculture, which makes up about one-third of GDP, benefits directly from road reopenings: each incident-free week prevents crop losses and helps stabilize food-price inflation. IMF forecasts indicate a 3% growth in 2025, up from 1.9% in 2024, assuming the current stability persists. In essence, the costs of DDR should be viewed as an investment, with returns reflected in higher agricultural production, restored flow of goods, and renewed confidence among economic players.

This process aligns with a specific political sequence. On April 19, a targeted agreement was reached in N’Djamena with two key rebel groups — the UPC and 3R — paving the way for their official disbandment in Bangui on July 10–11. The initiation of DDR in August operationalizes that commitment. But the gains remain delicate: other factions within the Coalition of Patriots for Change have not joined the deal and still have the capacity to cause harm.

MINUSCA, whose mandate extends until November 15, 2025, funds and oversees parts of the mechanism. Out of an annual budget of about $1.192 billion, a significant portion — estimated by diplomats at 10–15% — goes toward logistical support for DDR and electoral preparations. Bilateral donors supplement the budget, yet there remains a funding shortfall of around $40 million.

The key date remains the poll scheduled for December 28, 2025. The presidential election, along with legislative and local ballots, will decide whether the current momentum shifts into lasting change. The European Union and other partners are already linking part of their aid to the organization of credible elections. The memory of 2020 persists: violence and blockades caused nearly $200 million in lost agricultural and commercial output, and the pandemic intensified the shock. A repeat of this would undermine the current DDR, turning invested funds into waste.

On the other hand, a peaceful election would produce the expected multiplier effect: release of promised funds from Brussels, restart of reconstruction projects, and a steady decrease in the sovereign-risk premium. Opportunities for reintegrating ex-combatants and diversifying agriculture could then provide sustainable funding. The math is clear: investing $50–$100 million now in demobilization or risking losing several hundred million dollars each year to lost productivity, destroyed infrastructure, and emergency humanitarian aid. Based on economic logic, the first choice is the better option.

Risks persist, especially regarding security reliance on Russia, shifting from the Wagner Group to the “Africa Corps,” which is directly controlled by the Russian Defence Ministry. Documented abuses by the UN and NGOs damage the reputation of the arrangement, while unclear funding increases Western donor mistrust. For the Central African economy, the situation is straightforward: secure the security lull, hold the election peacefully, and use DDR to turn a significant expense into a stability asset. An election held in peace is less costly than one conducted amidst violence.

Idriss Linge