Ahead of the upcoming African European Union Summit in Luanda, the Africa-Europe Foundation has released its 'State of Africa-Europe 2025' report, calling for a radical shift in the partnership between the two continents. In this exclusive interview, Executive Director Paul Walton argues that the traditional donor-beneficiary dynamic is obsolete in today’s fragmented geopolitical landscape. Emphasizing the need to move beyond 'pledges and handouts' toward genuine co-investment and shared strategic interests—from green minerals to the blue economy—Walton outlines a blueprint for a modernized relationship built on mutual respect and tangible delivery. 

Agence Ecofin: You are the Executive Director of the Africa-Europe Foundation, which has just released a new report titled 'State of Africa-Europe 2025' on the state of Africa-Europe relations. This happens just a few days before the upcoming African-European Union Summit in Luanda, Angola. If you had to highlight one single core message for African and European leaders, what would it be?

Paul Walton: This is the moment for Africa-Europe to step up. It's a historic partnership. The fact that so many people meet in Luanda speaks to its political importance. Still, if you look at the world's geopolitics today, particularly in 2025, you see greater fragmentation. You see key traditional players withdrawing from multilateral cooperation. And if ever there was a time for this partnership between Africa and Europe to step up, it's now. For us, that's the central reflection, and we offer a report that provides an operational blueprint for doing so. It provides evidence that there's already enough happening to make you confident that Africa-Europe could play a much more transformative role, both as neighboring continents and in the world today.

Agence Ecofin: The report calls for a shift away from the donor-beneficiary relationship toward co-creation and risk sharing. In practical terms, what real change in mindset and posture does this require on both the European and the African side?

Paul Walton: Firstly, this shift is already happening in places, but we need to mainstream it, and we need to make sure that we move to this new reality faster. This summit can be a defining moment for that. Because, you know, the other models are outdated, and it's not just about Africa-Europe; it's about looking at the world more globally. We understand why certain institutions were built the way they were after the Second World War, back in 1945. We know why the United Nations was constructed the way it was, why the financial systems were designed as they were. But there is a global consensus that these institutions are not fit for purpose.

And it's the same with the Africa partnership. Again, it's to build on everything that's been done politically in the last 25 years, but it's to say that we need to definitively move to this, as you noted, co-investment, shared approach. And of course, we know our histories, so that's a mentality shift. It's about changing the way we do business. It's about mutual respect, mutual trust, a mutual understanding of the interests on both continents, and the topics where we can really go much deeper and faster in our cooperation.

"There is a global consensus that these institutions are not fit for purpose."

So some of those areas, again, whether it's the work on energy cooperation and this piece of work on green minerals that the African Union has also been pioneering, whether it's the work on illicit financial flows, which it is in the interest of both continents to step up and combat, whether it's in the way that, as good as the level of investment that's happening is, I think both continents could easily agree the level of investment could be significantly scaled and much faster. And to do that is going to take, again, much closer cooperation.

But the starting basic premise is that the old model, the old way of doing business, where, to simplify it, there's too much on the African side of asking for pledges and too much on the European side linking it to an old model of just handouts, doesn't work for anyone. And so, therefore, we need to be very clear together that this new model needs to work. It's about co-investment platforms that are built together. It's about, when it comes to infrastructure projects, making sure they're co-designed at every level, not just politically, but also making sure the decisions on where to do infrastructure projects and how to do them are really co-owned and co-designed.

"The old way of doing business [...] where there's too much on the African side of asking for pledges and too much on the European side linking it to an old model of just handouts, doesn't work for anyone."

And again, when it comes to complex and sensitive areas like illicit financial flows, there's so much to learn from each other about systems, processes, and digitalization. There is member-state expertise in both places, and if you look at regional integration, there's some great work happening on the African continent, and essential experience in Europe. There should be much more happening there. And again, I think, for historic reasons, and not just long history, but even the last four or five years, in terms of the climate emergency, in terms of how COVID played out, that cooperation hasn't reached its potential, and that's what we need.

Agence Ecofin: Since the 2022 summit, many commitments have been made in energy, infrastructure, health, jobs, and other sectors. Yet several of them are still only partially implemented. In this context, does it really make sense to expand the cooperation framework with new areas before fully delivering on the previous ones?

Paul Walton: It's a balance, because on the one hand, there's no doubt that any partnership like this needs to deliver what it said it would do, because that's also about trust with our societies. It's about our societies recognizing that meetings like those in Luanda matter. It's about understanding that when you come together at the multilateral level, things can work.

And again, this is against a backdrop that you know well: growing distrust in traditional institutions, and also the feeling that our politics isn't working in all our countries, across Europe and across Africa. So I do agree that you need that delivery, but at the same time, that shouldn't mean you can't look at the new topics or the different topics that need to be brought into the conversation.

Another risk in an institutional partnership is that you can develop good plans two or three years ago, but they can quickly become outdated. One example is infrastructure. I'm sure that if we really scrutinized some of the plans from the summit you mentioned three years ago, the potential for digitalization and AI, how that plays with infrastructure corridors, the way that infrastructure can be a tool to connect to new advancements in agriculture, energy cooperation, and other areas — all that thinking should happen.

So, for us, when we prepare the State of Africa-Europe report, we're very aware that we need to look through two lenses simultaneously. One needs to really look over what's worked effectively in terms of follow-up to previous commitments: where can we show examples that can be further scaled, deepened, and unpacked? And on the other hand, what's the future? What are the trends right now that we need to be aware of? What are the new topics where Africa-Europe could really step in? And what's the 2025 geopolitical reality compared to even three years ago?

When the last summit happened, it was a week before the invasion of Russia in Ukraine. We've seen other conflicts, both in Europe and Africa, evolve. We've seen new situations arising from the US’s withdrawal from multilateralism and USAID’s impact on sectors like health. So if we don't take that reality into account, some of those previous commitments will not really stand up.

So again, that's a way of saying we need to constantly look at the two aspects: how we do what we said we would do, and, equally, the new areas where we need to step up. And then a final thought on that: what we've done with the State of Africa-Europe report is really focus on where we see pockets of cooperation that are quick wins for Africa-Europe. One example is the ocean blue economy. It was absent from the previous summit. You won't see it in the conclusions.

As the Africa-Europe Foundation, we're proud to have played a role in bringing it more into the mainstream over the last couple of years, because we've seen some inspiring practices in Africa and Europe, as well as opportunities for mutual learning. Ocean governance and the blue economy are a perfect example of where you get to the heart of that nexus between climate policy and economic development.

We know that's been an agitated conversation for Europe-Africa, if you go back three or four years ago, because the European Union was stepping up its ambitions, rightly so, in terms of climate policy. Africa has consistently said: if we can't translate our cooperation into employability, jobs, youth, and economic inclusion, it doesn't work. So the blue economy is an excellent example of where it makes sense for Africa and Europe to deepen cooperation. It makes sense to address this and reconcile what shouldn't be an issue between climate policy and economic development. So that's an example of a subject we should be glad to bring onto the agenda.

Agence Ecofin: The report also proposes scorecards and platforms of digital monitoring tools. How can we ensure these mechanisms become effective accountability instruments rather than just another layer of reporting with no political consequences?

Paul Walton: Firstly, one of the key points the report makes on that is about streamlining and making reporting processes more coherent. We're very aware that organizations across Africa and Europe have to consider different frameworks: the UN Sustainable Development Goals, Agenda 2063, and the EU's Global Gateway. We need to ensure that, because the same member states are involved in the conversation, there's streamlining.

The reality is, and many reports back this up, that organizations will spend more time preparing financing documents and technical reporting than they will on implementation. And implementation is politically what everyone is asking for. So there seems to be something incoherent there that we need to address.

So we say in the report: we don't need to be shy about the fact that administrative reform matters. We talk about the fact that it should be as much about smart money as well as more money, and that's precisely about the processes. That's still at the heart of what we're saying. We're not talking about adding new things; we're talking, first and foremost, about streamlining and making it more straightforward.

And then, when it comes to specific tools, our point is that, again, if you look at the potential in Africa-Europe, not only should we be streamlining, but we should also be using digital tools and tracking more effectively. There's some great practice out there, some in the NGO sector, some in other organizations, but we've never seen this as an emphasis on just accountability. We've seen it as: if we're all interested in the same objective, we should have tools to help us implement it. That's really what people want.

We know that delivery is difficult. One thing is to make commitments; one thing is to make political announcements, but to deliver is difficult. And if that's the case, we need these tools to be helpful. That's where one of our founders, the Mo Ibrahim Foundation, has extensive experience with its governance index. I think the governance index is a tool that member states really use to improve governance, and we're considering the same approach more broadly at the Africa-EU partnership level.

Again, not at all to introduce tools for the sake of it, but to ask: which are the tools that could genuinely help member states understand where they need to put more effort to get the results that we've promised to our societies?

Agence Ecofin: You mentioned the blue economy earlier, but there are also critical and transition minerals. Europe is now actively seeking closer ties with Africa in this field. How can we ensure this does not reproduce an extractive model but instead supports true local value addition, industrialization, technology transfer, etc., for the African continent?

Paul Walton: I think two things. One, it goes back to the fundamental message you highlighted in the State of Africa-Europe report: if we change the model from how it is now, it should be one completely opposed to some of the historical practices of various partners.

Therefore, we welcome the increased focus on local value addition and local benefits within the broader discussion of green minerals. I think the second is to anchor the approach in the African Union’s work. We mention in the State of Africa-Europe report the AU’s recent green minerals strategy. That's an example where, when that's produced, it's a perfect opportunity for the European Union to step in and work closely with the African Union, because it's an Africa-led, pan-African plan, which very much emphasizes the risks you highlight, potentially with other geographical actors in the world when it comes to this.

When it comes to that local value addition engine, that's an example where there appears to be political consensus. You see it in many documents and declarations, so now you need to put it into practice. From my own travels in countries like Namibia, you can see examples of harmful practices and some positive practices in terms of cooperation. So again, our job as the foundation is to highlight where cooperation works best: when it really empowers the countries involved, allows them to build their economic capacity, and, most importantly, delivers a direct, positive impact for communities.

That's not just about economic inclusion and jobs, it's also about sustainability and the environmental dimension. I've had enough experience with visits in recent years to see some very harmful practices in that regard from other regional actors. And that's right: now, politically, there is alignment to move beyond that risk of a historic extraction model you mentioned.

« That's not just about economic inclusion and jobs, it's also about sustainability and the environmental dimension. I've had enough experience with visits in recent years to see some very harmful practices in that regard from other regional actors. »

The question now is to get into the details of which models work really well. We mention this in the opening of our report: we welcome the fact that in the last two or three years, which is a small period of time, there have been several MoUs and roadmaps signed between African Union member states and the European Union. So now is precisely the time, if those MoUs are going to be translated into operational practice, to get into practice. That's precisely where these questions need to be answered.

"There's a clear win-win here: Africa's ambitions for green industrialization and growth, and Europe's needs for energy, infrastructure, and security."

So again, we very much welcome the political will here. But our job is also to look, operationally, now at how this can really benefit the two continents. There's a clear win-win here: Africa's ambitions for green industrialization and growth, and Europe's needs for energy, infrastructure, and security. So again, it's about setting up that cooperation the right way, and that's fundamental in this report: the business model needs to be right. It's more than just the political intent.

Agence Ecofin: Many African leaders point out that Chinese, Russian, or Gulf financing is often faster and less constrained for large infrastructure projects. At the same time, we see that European procedures are slow and highly complex. In this competitive environment, what is Europe's real comparative advantage for African partners today?

Paul Walton: Europe has different competitive advantages in that sense. One, on the point we just discussed: when it comes to the local value addition of cooperation on green minerals, the sad reality is, at least from our assessment, there are actors in the world that have operated a very exploitative model. Europe needs to use its track record to set up the right cooperation to be a different kind of partner on this: to really be a partner that's there for the long term, building sustainable infrastructure.

We see in our report some good examples of this, so we're asking that the EU really mainstream that approach as well. Also, you mentioned technology transfer. Europe must understand its own areas of added value. If you zoom out, Europe has technology, it has finance, it has a really unique story in the world of regional integration that counts for a lot.

So, again, that's an example of where, if the historic business model of the Africa partnership changes, it allows for considerable competitive advantage for the partnership. That hasn't been there before, because then you're talking much more about technology and the exchange of know-how.

A very concrete example is tax, which has become much more central on the political agenda this year. Domestic resource mobilization and the reality check — you see that in the G20, you see that in various multilateral meetings. You saw it at the Financing for Development conference back in June: domestic resource mobilization is essential for investment in health systems, and there are many commitments.

When it comes to tax administrations, for example, we recently spoke with the leadership in Poland, who have an exhilarating experience with digital tax systems, digital tools to track irregular flows, and more. This is an example: there's vast experience in a member state like that which can be of great benefit for African counterparts, and maybe some of those practices have been a bit hidden, because the cooperation, as we said at the beginning of the conversation, has been limited too often to significant pledges and big announcements, rather than getting into the concrete areas.

Another area is the G20, politically. With the Africa-Europe Foundation, we've worked very closely. We had the privilege of facilitating the finance and tax workstream this year with South Africa and its presidency. Because you have EU member states in there, and because the African Union is a relatively new member of the G20, and because you had South Africa hosting it for the first time, you can see there's a compelling conversation there based on the experience of the EU preparing for those multilateral frameworks and how to leverage them, and Africa stepping up increasingly, and rightly so, into the global governance frameworks.

Suppose you apply that experience to reforming the UN Security Council, the UN, and other areas. In that case, it means the alliance between the EU — which carries a lot of weight in the existing international financial architecture and within the existing global system — and Africa can be mighty. If we want to reform these institutions, which we do, and we want Africa to take its seat at every table, which we do, then the EU is a vital ally there, particularly as other nations are stepping back from that space.

So again, that's another example where the EU has sometimes less visible influence. Still, a lot of our conversations on finance this year with African partners came down to this: whether it's debt repayments or domestic resource mobilization, the international financial system does not work for Africa today. The EU is a vital ally there, and that partnership hasn't yet been fully leveraged.

Agence Ecofin: We can see that the EU is stepping up its efforts to boost investments in Africa, but European investors still largely perceive Africa as a high-risk continent, reflected in the high yields at which African countries borrow on international markets, often much higher than those of comparable economies elsewhere. In some cases, governments find it easier and cheaper to borrow from China than to negotiate loans from European institutions that come with either heavy conditionalities or, in the case of the debt market, very high interest rates. In this context, is Europe truly ready to move beyond a risk-centric view of Africa and simplify its lending mechanisms?

Paul Walton: When we go to Luanda in the coming days, we're leading one of the strategic roundtables on investment. To do that, we've been carrying out action research. It's touched on in our State of Africa-Europe report, but we're going much deeper over the coming weeks into the exact question you're asking.

What we've done is an obvious case study. We've looked at some countries we work closely with, like Sierra Leone, which has a pipeline of energy investment projects. We've also spoken to some of the pension funds and investors in the Nordics, including Denmark, to gauge investment interest. If too much of the investment is going to other places, such as the US, while there is an investment pipeline in Sierra Leone, what's the issue? Where can we really accelerate that?

We're learning a lot from that, and it is correct that many companies see the risks in investing. Some of the dangers are real — we know the reality in some countries when it comes to governance, conflict, and other areas — and some are perceived, historical negative perceptions. It's in that space that I think we can be instrumental, because the nature of an organization like ours is to get into the data and the facts.

By focusing on this particular conversation, we see significant potential to scale investment, particularly by leveraging pension funds and other instruments and making what is, to us, an excellent investment case for European companies in key African countries.

Equally, we do see on the other side that what people call the "last mile" of the investment pipeline is an issue. When we really get into the details of investment platforms — I use Sierra Leone as an example — and you scrutinize 150 projects, let's say, you can still see that the final part of the preparation, the financial viability, needs more support. We're talking to several organizations that work in Africa-Europe about how to support this incubation phase and the last mile to ensure projects are ready for investment.

So we're talking about closing what, if you zoom out, is not a big gap, but it remains a significant gap if we want to completely scale up both the size and the speed of investment. I'm confident about what can be done there based on our research. I also know that, historically, because of the perception of history, those investment flows haven't happened. But now we're seeing more and more: how do you translate renewed political will into very pragmatic co-investment platforms and mechanisms that can really help that along and catalyze it?

It's clear that if you look at what needs to be achieved in terms of finance, that's exactly what I meant at the beginning of the conversation: there's an opportunity now for Africa-Europe to step up, to create incentive frameworks, and to get into this fundamental issue of long-term investment returns, which take into account currency risks, market distortions and so on.

Agence Ecofin: The EU has adopted a new pact on migration and asylum and is simultaneously developing talent partnerships with several African countries. How can Europe and Africa ensure that migration cooperation is not perceived simply as a trade-off — more border control in exchange for aid — but rather as a balanced, mutually beneficial framework?

Paul Walton: On that question, I'd like to highlight straight away a member state like Spain. Spain articulates this very well when it comes to the mutual benefit. We welcome Spain's approach to recognizing that migration is a natural part of our world, our economies, our history, and our future.

So, firstly, it's how we frame this. We know that in many countries, both in the EU and in Africa, the framing hasn't helped at all in this regard. It has often confused the narrative. We know it has been contentious because of these partial narratives, as we also say in the State of Africa-Europe report. Even if what people call irregular migration to Europe declined — I think we said around 39% in the first half of last year — the framing of this discussion is key. It needs to be sophisticated. It needs to get beyond the limited populist rhetoric that we see in different places.

Even if what people call irregular migration to Europe declined — I think we said around 39% in the first half of last year — the framing of this discussion is key.

Then it's also interesting to look through specific sectoral lenses. If you take an area like health, we touch on this in the State of Africa-Europe report, but we've also got a deeper analysis on the future of health workforces. If you look at the future of health workforces and the health needs in both Europe and Africa, health mobility is completely part of that story. Already, as you know, there's a tremendous amount of health mobility, but the question is how to structure it in a way that is mutually beneficial and doesn't lead to adverse outcomes, such as brain drain on one side.

If you look at the question through a sectoral lens, you begin to understand where there are policies that could really be of absolute mutual benefit. To sum up, there's a need for much more structured dialogue on migration, governance, and systems to promote circular labour migration and the sectoral approach. And when I mentioned Spain, it's also a reminder not to cast all the member states of both the African Union and the EU into one bubble. The fact is, there are member states that are really articulating why this is so central to our future, and something we should be building and getting excited about, not something that has become so contentious and unspeakable.

Agence Ecofin: On major global issues, such as the war in Ukraine, many African countries have adopted a non-aligned or neutral position, while at the same time, they do not want partners to dictate their internal policies. How should Europe interpret this new posture?

Paul Walton: Europe and Africa both need to recognize that we are in a multipolar world. That's why reality today is very different from that of previous decades. The fact of a multipolar world is that there are many overlapping relationships, and it's much more sophisticated. That's different from the history you had in Europe in the 20th century, when it came to certain alliances and the kind of Cold War dynamic of "if you're with us or you're against us".

So we need to make sure this partnership is situated in the 21st-century reality, not trapped in past dynamics. That means the multipolar reality should be acknowledged: there are many different relationships, so it's very normal for individual countries to align with or not with other conflicts. That's the first point.

Of course, we're very aware — and we touch on this briefly in the State of Africa-Europe report — that the perception of double standards in conflict is clear. When you look at the Russian invasion of Ukraine, when you look at Gaza, when you look at what's happening in Sudan, this all has to be looked at holistically. We understand why certain media in different parts of the world focus on other areas, and certain politics do too, but the reality is that those conflicts are all significant. The people in our continent know that. They know it should never be that one conflict is valued above another, but there is a perception that this happens sometimes.

“We need to make sure this partnership is situated in the 21st-century reality, not trapped in past dynamics. That means the multipolar reality should be acknowledged: there are many different relationships, so it's very normal for individual countries to align with or not with other conflicts.”

So that's the second issue: how do we ensure that a single issue or conflict doesn't dominate the Africa-Europe partnership dialogue? We must understand holistically how the partnership's role in conflict of any kind on both continents should be central.

The third aspect is that, even though in my first point I underlined the multipolar dimension and the fact that, for each country, it's legitimate to choose its approach — and that should be accepted by both Europe and Africa — at the same time, there is a need and an opportunity for increased alignment at the multilateral level when it comes to the United Nations and other areas of reform. That's where I really see a massive opportunity.

If you look at the discussions that are just beginning now about reforming the UN Security Council or the future of the United Nations, Europe has less to gain from them. Some of the traditional EU member states may have less to gain. Africa has everything to gain. It's inevitable: Africa is rightly taking its seat at all these tables.

Secondly, there was good practice in the G20: the EU stepped up. I remember that with President Macky Sall at the time at the African Union. The EU stepped up, strongly supporting and pushing for the African Union's G20 seat. It's the same now: it's a good opportunity for the EU and the African Union to align and, from our shared perspective, say what global governance mechanisms we want in the future and how we can really push for them.

Going back to your question on everything from transition minerals to the economy: what are the practices we want to promote, the global governance practices? Because, at the end of the day, as I said at the beginning, we must respect individual member state approaches, we're talking about a multilateral framework. At the same time, we're talking about multilateralism being under attack, so we need to step up and defend it. That does mean we'll have to find ways to unite around common causes.

We say this in the State of Africa-Europe report — I think it's also mentioned in the executive summary — that we've seen some, not many, but some very tangible examples of the AU-EU working increasingly well at the multilateral level. The Seville Compromise, as the UN Secretary-General said only a week ago, was driven by the partnership between Africa and Europe to push that over the line at the Financing for Development conference back in June.

On the pandemic accord, negotiations were complex, but in the end, Africa and Europe really brought their partnership to bear to make it happen—the same for the UN Pact for the Future last year. Looking to 2026, at the level of ocean governance, several treaties are being negotiated that, if Africa and Europe unite, could really drive them over the line.

So again, we have to get this careful balance you mentioned: allowing countries, legitimately, in a multipolar world, to decide their approaches based on their interests and histories. But we equally have to be ready to sometimes put aside some of our individual and national priorities for the greater good of global governance and what we can do together. That's the balance Africa and Europe should aim for in the future.

Agence Ecofin: If in 2030, you had to point to one concrete, measurable achievement that would demonstrate the success of the Luanda Summit — whether in energy, jobs, value chains, or financing — what should that achievement be, and why?

Paul Walton: The achievements that the Luanda Summit could be catalytic for… Firstly, if you measure it, you'd want to know that, in 2030, more people in our societies see the gains of this partnership than do today. That direct improvement would be key, and it is at the heart of many of the things we're advocating through the State of Africa-Europe report.

No political partnership throughout history has worked if it has a disconnect from the societies it's set up to serve. So one indicator you'd like is that Luanda was another step in bringing this partnership closer to people, and that when you did the annual aggregation of various barometers and public opinion, you were able to say: yes, there is increased — however modest — recognition at the public level that this is a valuable partnership. I suspect that can also happen because of the geopolitical situation and the way Africa can step into a particular space. So I think that would be one clear achievement.

The second would be on investment. Again, we touched on that in this conversation. If we're advocating for a change of business model, if we're talking very concretely about what we're learning from the research between Sierra Leone and the Nordics — about opportunities for new co-investment platforms to really be catalytic, to open up new investment, to bring in European investors much closer to Africa than they have been traditionally — then, of course, investment would be a second indicator.

The third is the follow-up to the summits. This is the 25th year that the African Union and the EU have been meeting in this way, through summits. We, as the Africa-Europe Foundation, even though we're young, helped put the concept of monitoring into the summit's conclusions in Brussels three years ago. We really pushed for that, and we had strong support from the co-presidency at the time to say: you're going to have to include a point in the conclusions that you're committed to tracking commitments.

People need to see it, people need to know we're serious, because if not, they become cynical about these things. We're going to take the next step with Luanda. We anticipate that the conclusions will start to discuss the "how". Brussels was about the "what": we need to monitor commitments. Luanda needs to push us closer to the "how": what are the tools? You mentioned a couple, we talked about a couple.

I think that gives us a good opportunity after Luanda to get into the detail of what the different tools are that we can use to improve implementation and get into that space of smarter money, not just more money — improving the processes, all these things which, I have to say, are the less "sexy" part of the Africa-Europe partnership sometimes, but could be the most transformative part.

Interview by Moutiou Adjibi Nourou