• Trump's tariffs add to EU barriers, hindering African exports beyond commodities.
• Asia/Middle East offer limited non-raw trade due to robust local production.
• AfCFTA offers a unique opportunity to boost intra-Africa trade, but there is an urgent need to achieve infrastructure, payments, and travel ease

A Bloomberg article from August 1, 2025, underscores Citigroup's analysis that proposed U.S. tariffs under President Trump could hasten Africa's reorientation toward China and the European Union (EU) as primary trading partners. This development comes at a time when the United States has long relinquished its position as Africa's top trade ally, with China surging ahead and the EU holding a distant second place.

Africa's Evolving Trade Dynamics: A Shift Away from Traditional Partners

Historically, the continent's exports have been dominated by commodities such as oil, minerals, and agricultural products, which constitute most of its international trade. Over the past decade, China's influence has grown considerably, with bilateral trade volumes exceeding $280 billion in 2024—more than twice the U.S.-Africa trade of approximately $100 billion. The EU, while still significant, accounts for about 15-20% of Africa's exports, compared to China's 20-25% and the U.S.'s declining 5-7%.

The U.S. has experienced a reduction in influence due to increased domestic energy independence from the shale revolution, which diminished demand for African oil, alongside heightened competition from other global suppliers. Policy issues, such as the irregular renewal of preferences under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), have further weakened U.S.-Africa relations. For example, AGOA's benefits have been suspended for several countries over governance concerns, restricting duty-free access for African goods.

Meanwhile, the EU's role as a secondary partner faces export challenges for African nations. Despite frameworks like Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) and the Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative, which offer preferential access to least-developed countries, African producers face high compliance costs and limited market entry. These issues are compounded by Africa's reliance on commodity exports, leaving little room for adding value. As global trade tensions escalate—exemplified by Trump's tariff proposals—Africa must navigate these challenges carefully, seeking diversification while contending with deep-rooted barriers.

Trump's Tariffs: A Fresh Hurdle Building on EU's Long-Standing Restrictions

The introduction of new U.S. tariffs marks a significant increase in trade barriers for African exporters, building on a series of tariff and non-tariff measures already imposed by the EU. This "double whammy" not only disrupts immediate trade flows but also sustains Africa's dependence on low-value exports, impeding its industrialisation efforts. The EU's barriers have long been a persistent obstacle to African trade. Although preferential schemes offer duty-free access, tariffs remain on "sensitive" items: up to 50% on cereals like rice and maize, and an astonishing 300% on processed sugar. These protections defend European agricultural interests but hinder African processing industries, leaving exports unrefined and susceptible to price volatility.

Even more insidious are the EU' s non- tariff barriers (NTBs), which studies suggest hinder African exports more than tariffs do. Sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) standards, technical trade barriers (TBT), and new environmental regulations require strict compliance. For agri- food products—a key element of African exports—restrictions on pesticide residues, contaminants, and supply chain traceability impose significant costs, often unaffordable for small- scale producers.

The EU's 2025 deforestation regulation, for example, requires verifiable evidence that commodities like cocoa, coffee, and timber are deforestation-free, risking market exclusion for non-compliant African suppliers and potential penalties. According to research from the European University Institute, these SPS measures alone can slash African agri- food exports by 10-20%—bureaucratic delays in customs and quality certifications further act as de facto tariffs, eroding competitiveness.

Into this context, Trump's tariffs, announced in mid-2025 as part of a broader strategy to curb U. S. trade deficits, come into play. These include a universal 10% tariff on all imports, with escalations to 30% on goods from South Africa and Algeria, and 25% from Nigeria and Ghana. Sectors like agriculture, automotive, and minerals—key to African economies—are particularly vulnerable. South Africa’s central bank projects up to 100 100,000 job losses, mainly in farming and vehicle manufacturing. Broader economic forecasts anticipate a 10-20% decline in African exports to the U. S., urging diversification but causing short-term financial pain.

Unlike the EU's regulatory NTBs, which are embedded and gradual, U. S. tariffs are abrupt and price-based, immediately inflating costs for exporters already strained by EU hurdles. Nigerian oil producers or Ghanaian cocoa farmers, for instance, must now contend with both EU sustainability mandates and U. S. duties, potentially leading to reduced volumes, higher prices, or complete market withdrawal. This sequential buildup of barriers discourages foreign investment in African manufacturing, trapping the continent in a cycle of commodity dependence and economic fragility.

Slim Prospects in Alternative Markets: Beyond Commodities, Barriers Persist

While diversification toward Asia and the Middle East appears logical in response to Western restrictions, these markets offer limited opportunities for African exports outside of mining and agricultural raw materials. Their robust production ecosystems and self-sufficient consumption patterns create formidable entry barriers, often reinforcing Africa's peripheral role in global value chains.

Asia, led by China and India, has emerged as Africa's dominant trading bloc, but the partnership is lopsided. Raw commodities comprise 80-90% of African exports to the region, while imports consist primarily of manufactured items like machinery and electronics. China's Belt and Road Initiative has financed critical infrastructure, yet it has also saturated African markets with inexpensive Asian goods, undermining local industries. For non-commodity sectors—such as processed foods, textiles, or consumer products—

Asian economies are highly competitive and protective. Countries like Vietnam and Bangladesh dominate the apparel sector, outpacing African alternatives due to lower costs and established supply chains. Tariffs and domestic preferences further deter African entrants. Moreover, China's economic slowdown and pivot toward high-tech industries have tempered demand for African commodities, thereby narrowing the diversification windows.

The Middle East mirrors these constraints. Gulf nations, including the UAE and Saudi Arabia, are pursuing diversification via programs like Vision 2030, investing in African resources but showing scant interest in non-raw imports. Trade remains compartmentalized, with Africa as a supplier of unprocessed goods and the Middle East exporting refined products and services. Regional conflicts add geopolitical risks, disrupting logistics and investments. Intra-Middle Eastern trade blocs, such as the Gulf Cooperation Council, prioritize internal exchanges, while advanced manufacturing reduces external demand. Compounding this are Africa's infrastructural deficiencies—poor trade corridors and security issues—that make rerouting inefficient.

The AfCFTA Opportunity: Accelerating Integration for Self-Reliance

Amid these external pressures, the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) emerges as a beacon of hope, promising to foster intra-African trade and reduce dependence on volatile global markets. Launched in 2019 and operational from 2021, AfCFTA unites 54 nations into a single market of 1.3 billion consumers with a $3.4 trillion GDP, potentially increasing intra-African trade by 52% through 2025 via tariff eliminations and rule harmonization. Projections suggest it could add $450 billion to continental income in less than 10 years, unlocking sectors like services, manufacturing, and digital commerce.

Realizing these potential demand urgent acceleration in critical enablers:

1. Logistics Infrastructure: Africa's subpar roads, ports, and railways inflate trade costs, with the continent's logistics performance trailing global benchmarks by 20-30%. AfCFTA is expected to drive a 28% surge in freight by 2030, highlighting the need for projects like the Lagos-Abidjan corridor and digitized customs. Early pilots have reduced clearance times by 35%, but scaling requires $100 billion in annual investments.
2. Payment Solutions: Fragmented financial systems impose high fees and currency risks on cross-border transactions. The AfCFTA's Digital Trade Protocol promotes integrations, such as the Pan-African Payment and Settlement System (PAPSS), which could reduce costs by 40% and empower small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) that drive 80% of African trade.
3. Easing Travel Restrictions: Visa hurdles restrict business mobility, with only 27% of Africans enjoying visa-free continental travel. Implementing the African Union's Free Movement Protocol could enhance trade by 25%, building essential networks for AfCFTA's success. Delays here could undermine the agreement's efficacy.

Finally, while U.S. tariffs and EU barriers present daunting challenges, the AfCFTA offers a strategic avenue for resilience. By prioritising these accelerations, Africa can transform trade adversities into engines of sustainable growth, fostering a more integrated and prosperous continent. This shift requires collective political will, investment, and innovation to ensure the most complete realisation of its potential.

Idriss Linge