The fight against money laundering in West Africa is currently weakened by a critical lack of resources. In an interview with Ecofin Agency, conducted in Lomé (Togo) on the sidelines of a seminar for ECOWAS parliamentarians, Edwin W. Harris Jr., the Director General of the Inter-Governmental Action Group Against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA), addressed the issue.

Facing unprecedented budget constraints from declining community levies and delayed contributions from member states, the head of GIABA calls for sustainable and predictable funding. In the interview, he insisted that the effective implementation of existing laws is even more critical than creating new ones.

In a candid discussion, Harris covered persistent regional threats, institutional shortcomings, and strategies to counter the rapid evolution of financial crimes. He argues that only a firm will and a clear commitment from states can turn legal texts into tangible results.

Ecofin Agency (EA): GIABA is going through a budget crisis. Is this solely due to delayed contributions from member states, or is it also a sign of a lack of political will?

Edwin W. Harris Jr. (E.W.): That's a key question, and it gets to the heart of our current difficulties. To be clear, this budget crisis isn't unique to GIABA; it impacts every ECOWAS institution. The problem stems from a single source: a decline in the community levy, which is the regional tax that provides the primary funding for all our organizations.

When that resource shrinks, it’s not just GIABA that suffers. The ECOWAS Commission, the Court of Justice, the Parliament, and all our other specialized agencies are affected as well. Our financial systems are interconnected—a drop in our main revenue stream immediately leads to restrictions on programs and activities.

GIABA has established several partnerships, including one with the African Development Bank, which is currently funding a project in ten of our member states, and with the European Union on initiatives that provide incentives for compliance. While these are positive signs, they can't replace the stability of a permanent funding source.

EA:  So you're refuting the idea that there's a lack of political will?

E.W.: Absolutely. The political will is there. Our member states fully understand the importance of fighting money laundering and terrorist financing. But the strongest resolve can't overcome our financial realities. When community resources decline, our programs are automatically cut back. This isn't a choice; it's a budgetary constraint. That’s why we use every opportunity, like this interview, to raise awareness among our member states about the urgent need to make our funding mechanism more stable.

EA: What options do you have for overcoming this situation? What innovative reforms are you implementing to secure more funding?

E.W.: We've had to be innovative and pragmatic. First, we looked for ways to diversify our funding. But we're up against a global trend here: the decline in external aid. USAID is a perfect example; they were a major partner for a long time before they drastically cut their presence and funding. The reasons are many: geopolitical redeployment, economic pressures in donor countries, and a shift in their strategic priorities. Given this context, we didn't wait around. GIABA has established several partnerships, including one with the African Development Bank, which is currently funding a project in ten of our member states, and with the European Union on initiatives that provide incentives for compliance. While these are positive signs, they can't replace the stability of a permanent funding source.

EA: Does this mean you’ve had to reevaluate your priorities?

E.W.: Exactly. While all our programs are important, we have to prioritize. For instance, journalist awareness activities or civil society mobilization programs are useful for engaging the community and promoting transparency. But when resources get tight, we have to focus our efforts on what I call our "core business": mutual evaluations, direct technical assistance for financial intelligence units, and monitoring compliance with international recommendations.

We've adopted a risk-based approach. Each country in the region first conducts a national risk assessment for money laundering and terrorist financing. Based on those findings, we then create customized programs. Some countries need support to train their magistrates, while others need to strengthen the supervision of non-financial professions like real estate agents, accountants, or lawyers. Our resources must adapt to those specific needs.

On the regulatory front, we've made significant progress. The two cycles of FATF mutual evaluations confirm this: our countries' technical compliance has improved dramatically.

EA: Yet, after twenty years, West Africa remains vulnerable to money laundering and terrorist financing. Why do these blockages persist?

E.W.: It's a complex question. Our vulnerabilities persist because the challenges are deep-seated and systemic. The informal economy dominates in most of our countries, and corruption remains a scourge, as does the weakness of our judicial systems. In some cases, the problem isn't a lack of will; it's a lack of information or a failure to grasp the full scale of the risks.

I can give you a concrete example. During a mission to Togo, we met the Prime Minister. She was surprised to discover certain institutional shortcomings she was not fully aware of. Our discussions led to tangible progress, particularly in strengthening the National Financial Intelligence Unit. This shows that sometimes, the obstacle isn't a lack of will, but simply a lack of awareness.

We also have to admit that criminal networks possess vast financial and technological resources. They're constantly innovating to circumvent our surveillance systems. This means our institutions are often in a position of playing catch-up. That's why we stress the importance of investing in continuous training, technological tools, and international cooperation.

EA: What is the main institutional weakness in the region now?

E.W.: On the regulatory front, we've made significant progress. The two cycles of FATF mutual evaluations confirm this: our countries' technical compliance has improved dramatically. The laws are in place, and the regulatory frameworks exist. But the real problem is implementation.

In most countries, those laws aren't enforced with the necessary rigor. Effectiveness is measured by a state's ability to investigate, prosecute, convict, and confiscate criminal assets. That's where we fall short. I can't stress this enough: without effective application, laws are just empty shells.

Every illicit flow that escapes taxation deprives a state of resources to finance its schools, its hospitals, its roads. We are not just talking about financial standards, but about security, stability, and development

EA: What can be done to strengthen implementation?

E.W.: We’re taking a two-pronged approach. First, there’s technical assistance, where we train magistrates, investigators, and financial analysts. Second, we focus on political advocacy, which involves engaging with the highest authorities. When a president or prime minister takes ownership of these issues, things move much faster. That’s why we're conducting more of what we call “high-level” missions, where we meet directly with decision-makers to explain the risks and solutions.

EA: So, can we say that the fight against money laundering has become a national security issue?

E.W.: Absolutely. Every dollar laundered is a dollar that potentially fuels criminal activities, including terrorism. Every illicit flow that escapes taxation deprives a state of resources to finance its schools, its hospitals, its roads. We are not just talking about financial standards, but about security, stability, and development. This is the message we want to get across to our parliamentarians and our governments.

In many countries, institutions still operate in silos. [...] This fragmentation severely reduces our overall effectiveness.

EA: You also emphasize domestic cooperation a lot. Why?

E.W.: Because in many countries, institutions still operate in silos. For example, a financial intelligence unit may see itself as independent from law enforcement, which in turn doesn't collaborate enough with the central bank or the insurance regulator. This fragmentation severely reduces our overall effectiveness. We saw these weaknesses clearly during the second cycle of mutual evaluations. That's why we're now promoting what we call "domestic cooperation": all competent agencies must work hand in hand. To support this, we provide joint training and encourage the establishment of inter-institutional committees.

Fiacre E. Kakpo (Left)  with Edwin W. Harris Jr. (Right)

EA: You often mention the need to "take the profit out of crime." What do you mean by that?

E.W.: It's a simple but effective philosophy. As long as criminals can keep the profits from their activities, they have an incentive to continue. If, on the other hand, we strengthen the seizure, confiscation, and recovery of assets, we make these activities much less attractive.

Take an example: if you steal a phone, you give it to someone, and the justice system takes it away from you to return it to its owner, you lose both the ill-gotten gains and your freedom. The next time, you will think twice. Applying this principle to illicit financial flows is one of the surest ways to deter organized crime.

EA: Many West African countries have been or are still under FATF surveillance. What are the concrete consequences of being on the gray list, and how does GIABA support these states?

E.W.: First, there's the reputational consequence. A country placed on the gray list sends a negative signal to international investors. It indicates that it has "strategic deficiencies" in its anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing framework. Serious investors, who look for predictable environments that comply with international standards, become hesitant to get involved.

The second consequence is financial. Correspondent banks and international institutions increase their scrutiny. This raises the cost of transactions, slows down financial flows, and can even lead to the termination of some banking relationships. For modest-sized economies, like those in the WAEMU region, this can have a very significant deterrent effect.

If we were to apply the FATF criteria based on economic size, many of our states would be candidates for the gray list. Take Togo, for example. With a GDP of around ten billion dollars, it's exposed to pressures that larger economies like Nigeria do not face. But beyond the numbers, it's important to stress that most countries in the region have made regulatory progress. The problem is not so much the law, but its application.

If we were to apply the FATF criteria based on economic size, many of our states would be candidates for the gray list.

This is why GIABA emphasizes technical assistance and monitoring. When a country is placed on the list, we set up specific programs that include training, support for the financial intelligence unit, and strengthening parliamentary oversight. The goal is to prevent this listing from becoming a permanent condemnation.

EA: The third round of mutual evaluations begins in 2026. What will be different from the previous ones?

E.W.: This third cycle will be more demanding. The FATF has learned lessons from the first two, and the emphasis will now be on effectiveness. In other words, it won’t be enough to have just passed a law or created an institution. You will have to demonstrate that these mechanisms are actually working. This means showing clear metrics: how many investigations have been conducted? How many convictions have been handed down? How many criminal assets have been confiscated?

We're already encouraging our member states to request re-ratings on certain recommendations to help lighten the burden during the full evaluation. But let's not be naive: the standards will be stricter, and countries that fail to implement their laws risk being weakened.

EA: In addition to these structural issues, new threats are emerging: cybercrime, crypto-assets, and unregulated cross-border flows. How is GIABA adapting?

E.W.: Technology is evolving faster than regulation. In almost all of our countries, there is not yet a legal framework to regulate crypto-assets. However, our citizens are already using them massively, sometimes for legitimate transactions, but also for fraudulent activities. We are working with central banks and financial regulators to develop a common approach. The idea is not to ban them, but to secure and protect our economies. On cybercrime, we have conducted several typology studies. This work analyzes how criminals exploit digital loopholes, payment systems, or maritime networks. These reports must be read and used by states. They contain concrete recommendations to adapt regulation and guide investigations.

EA: You publish a lot of reports. What kind of practical use do these reports get?

E.W.: We invest a lot of energy and resources in research. But too often, these documents remain in drawers. This is a problem. A typology report is not an academic exercise: it is a practical tool that allows authorities to understand new criminal trends and adapt their policies. I’ll take the example of the report on the maritime sector in the Gulf of Guinea. It shows precisely how illicit flows pass through certain commercial activities. If this document is read and applied, it can inspire reforms in port or customs regulations. Otherwise, it is useless.

EA: According to your latest annual report, liberal professions such as lawyers remain highly sensitive categories, exposed in the fight. Can you tell us more?

E.W.: This is one of the most difficult areas. By their nature, bar associations are self-regulated institutions, and they are fiercely protective of their independence. But all over the world, lawyers are vulnerable to being used for money laundering, particularly through the creation of shell companies or the management of funds.

However, we are seeing progress. In Nigeria, for example, the bar association has started to implement compliance rules related to money laundering. It’s a gradual process. I believe that in the long run, other countries will follow, but it will require education, dialogue, and sometimes, binding measures.

EA: With Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger announcing their withdrawal from ECOWAS, what are the consequences for GIABA?

E.W.: This is an unprecedented situation. GIABA is an ECOWAS institution, but we chose to get ahead of this. Our regulations allow us to admit non-ECOWAS members. We have therefore agreed to allow these three countries to submit a formal request to become full GIABA members, outside of the ECOWAS framework. This means they will participate in our programs, be evaluated, and contribute financially to the best of their ability. However, we won't be able to use community funds for them. Every activity concerning them will have to be fully funded by their specific contributions. It's a pragmatic choice. We cannot leave these countries on the sidelines, because criminal flows ignore borders.

EA: Some observers believe that GIABA took a risk by opening the door to these countries.

E.W.: I consider it our duty. If we secure Togo, Ghana, or Senegal, but leave Mali or Niger vulnerable, our efforts will be in vain. Organized crime knows no political boundaries. The only way to be effective is to integrate everyone into the system. Of course, this comes at a cost, but it’s better to pay this price than to face the consequences of increased regional destabilization.

If we secure Togo, Ghana, or Senegal, but leave Mali or Niger vulnerable, our efforts will be in vain. Organized crime knows no political boundaries.

EA: What was your main message to the parliamentarians you recently met in Lomé?

E.W.: I told them this: parliamentary oversight is not a formality; it is a national security imperative. Every time a parliamentary committee demands accountability for the use of a budget, it strengthens transparency, it disrupts the machinery of corruption, and it protects democratic integrity. We need strong parliaments, with technical means, capable of reading an audit report, detecting weak signals, and demanding corrections. This is how the fight against money laundering will become a cross-cutting public policy, and not the affair of a handful of technicians.

EA: What is your vision for GIABA in the coming years?

E.W.: I see two urgent priorities. First, we need to consolidate our funding. Without predictable resources, no institution can fulfill its mission. We are therefore calling on our member states for a clear and firm commitment. Second, we must improve effectiveness. The laws are in place, the institutions exist; now it’s time to act. That means to investigate, prosecute, confiscate, and convict. If we achieve these two goals, then we can say that West Africa will have turned a corner. Financial crime will not disappear, but it will become more difficult, riskier, and less profitable. And that, in itself, would be a win.

Interview by Fiacre E. Kakpo