Burundi’s decision to pilot renminbi settlement for Chinese imports is a neat headline and a helpful starting point for a wider African debate. Bujumbura has allowed a small cohort of importers to pay suppliers in yuan, a targeted fix for chronic FX tightness and costly dollar conversions. The impulse is understandable: a thin reserve cushion and a long struggle with currency pressures make any avenue that lowers transaction frictions look attractive. But a pilot is not a pivot—and Africa should treat yuan adoption as a tool of convenience, not an ideology.

The case for limited RMB use is straightforward. China is a top goods supplier to the continent; paying Chinese firms in their own currency reduces the need for FX conversion and can steady landed costs when the dollar is on a tear. Beijing has also built the pipes—its Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS) handled roughly ¥175 trillion in 2024, a sharp rise as banks and corporates seek redundancy to dollar rails. That plumbing matters: when payment infrastructure is reliable, treasury desks follow. 

Yet the global context should sober the most enthusiastic converts. The RMB’s international footprint is growing but still small. By mid-2025, yuan accounted for just under 3% of global SWIFT payments—sixth worldwide—and roughly 2.2% of disclosed central-bank reserves, compared with nearly 58% for the dollar. Those shares tell you something crucial: Africa may be able to pay some Chinese invoices in RMB, but it will still need dollars and euros for the bulk of everything else—from services and freight to interest and principal on hard-currency debt.

Debt is where the romance ends. Africa’s external public debt topped roughly $1.1 trillion in 2023, and debt service obligations are heavy this decade. Most of that stock—and its servicing—remains in dollars and euros. Swapping a slice of trade settlement into yuan doesn’t change the currency of your bond prospectus. If anything, aggressive RMB uptake without offsetting RMB inflows can create a second mismatch: you’re long RMB for trade, still short dollars for debt, and juggling basis risk in between. 

It’s also easy to overstate the insulation benefits. China’s promotion of yuan usage is explicit policy—Beijing is urging state firms to prioritise RMB abroad—and the e-CNY experiments keep expanding. But capital controls remain tight, and the currency’s global role still lags. For African treasurers, that means imperfect liquidity, thinner hedging instruments, and a settlement ecosystem that, while improving, is not yet plug-and-play across counterparties and sectors. Use it where it reduces friction; don’t pretend it erases it.

The Burundi “why now” is instructive. FX reserves are limited, inflation has been high, and the franc suffered a step devaluation in 2023 that still echoes through import prices. In that environment, letting select importers use RMB is a rational way to ease dollar demand at the margin. But it’s a tactical patch on a structural tear: without stronger export earnings, better FX price discovery, and tighter macro anchors, the currency mix of import invoices won’t deliver lasting stability.

Nor does the yuan provide a free lunch. When Africa imports more from China than it exports, RMB balances need backstopping—usually via swap lines. Nigeria’s renewal of a ¥15 billion swap is a case in point: useful for trade facilitation, but ultimately a contingent liability that concentrates counterparty risk with one central bank. Swaps are safety valves, not new reservoirs. 

There is, however, a strategic path that does scale: build domestic and regional rails so fewer transactions ever need a third-country currency. The Pan-African Payment and Settlement System (PAPSS) is precisely that bet, allowing cross-border payments in local currencies and now layering an “African Currency Marketplace” to match buyers and sellers of regional FX. It’s not glamorous policy, but it is sovereignty-enhancing. If a Ghanaian importer can pay a Kenyan supplier in cedis while the bank settles net in shillings, the continent’s scarce hard currency is conserved for what truly requires it.

So, RMB adoption should be treated the way a prudent treasurer treats every tool on the desk: use it where it cuts cost and risk, ignore it where it doesn’t. Set clear guardrails—transparent pricing, measured limits, and rigorous stress tests on RMB liquidity. Keep the debt stack in view and hedge the basis risk you’re creating. Above all, put the policy muscle behind what ultimately moves the needle: tradable supply at home, deeper local capital markets, and continent-wide payment plumbing that makes third-currency dependence the exception, not the rule. The yuan can be a helpful wrench. It is not the engine. 

Idriss Linge