As Publisher of Défis Actuels, a Cameroonian magazine, and President of the Economic Press Club, François Bambou is a close observer of Cameroonian economic policy. Having compiled and coordinated interviews with top public officials for a special dossier, he gained a broad view of government action and communication. In this exclusive with Business in Cameroon, Bambou analyzes these insights, offering a critical look at SME support policies, housing finance, public finance modernization, and state-private sector relations.

Business in Cameroon: In your interviews with government officials, particularly Economy Minister Alamine Ousmane Mey and Finance Minister Louis Paul Motaze, what concrete commitments did you hear regarding job creation for youth? Based on your observations, are these policies yielding the expected results, and what do officials reveal about the true scale of the youth employment challenge in Cameroon?

François Bambou: I acknowledge a refreshing level of candor in their responses, especially when discussing the sheer scale and complexity of the problems, particularly given the state's tight financial constraints. It is crucial to remember that due to the ongoing security crisis, three regions of the country are not contributing to the state budget; instead, they are absorbing greater resources because of the high costs associated with stabilization, reconstruction, and security deployment.

The interviews with both ministers confirmed that youth employment remains the central focus of the National Development Strategy 2020-2030 (SND30). Economy Minister Alamine Ousmane Mey emphasized support for flagship companies and import-substitution structures that utilize local products. The goal is to stimulate domestic production and transformation, which are direct sources of jobs. He specifically cited the Integrated Plan for Agro-pastoral and Fisheries Import-. Substitution (PIISAH) and the Initial Import-Substitution Impulse Program. These initiatives target high-potential sectors such as cocoa, soy, rice, milk, and fish, with the ambition of generating thousands of jobs in the medium term.

It is crucial to remember that due to the ongoing security crisis, three regions of the country are not contributing to the state budget; instead, they are absorbing greater resources because of the high costs associated with stabilization, reconstruction, and security deployment.

Finance Minister Louis Paul Motaze, on the other hand, focused on the tax incentives designed to encourage the establishment of companies with high employment potential in the same priority sectors. He also highlighted the 200 billion CFA francs Guarantee Fund established to support national companies that struggle to secure the collateral required for bank credits. Furthermore, he detailed budgetary and fiscal measures adopted specifically for the crisis-affected regions of the North-West, South-West, and Far North, where private investment and infrastructure reconstruction are expected to create over 15,600 jobs.

This government strategy was significantly hampered from its start by the COVID-19 crisis, the ripple effects of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and the persistence of the security crises involving terrorist groups and separatist movements in the three aforementioned regions. It is, in fact, surprising that the SND30 has not yet been updated to reflect these massive shifts.

The government's files are full of revolutionary plans, but they are all sinking in the maze of a bureaucracy known to be as tangled as it is corrupt.

On the ground, the evidence collected shows that these policies are starting to produce concrete results: support for young entrepreneurs, a revival of local agriculture and commerce, and infrastructure projects that create direct employment. Last mid-August, Economy Minister Alamine Ousmane Mey released 13.5 billion CFA francs to various bodies implementing the PIISAH program to boost production in the rice, fish, milk, and maize sectors. The primary goal is to cut the imports of these commodities—which worsen the trade deficit—but, crucially, to create tens of thousands of jobs across the country.

You interviewed Minister of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (MINPMEESA), Achille Bassilekin III, and Finance Minister Louis Paul Motaze on support mechanisms for SMEs, specifically the 200 billion CFA francs guarantee fund and technical assistance programs. What did these officials tell you about the real effectiveness of these measures? As a privileged observer, can you confirm these mechanisms are actually reaching Cameroonian SMEs, and what persistent obstacles have you identified?

The heads of MINPMEESA and the Ministry of Finance presented a dense framework of SME support, integrating tax relief, financing, incubation, formalization, and technical assistance. They cited the 200 billion CFA francs Guarantee Fund mentioned previously, the Blupass system (for outsourcing debt management and protection against non-payment), the PAD-PME program (Support Program for the Development of SMEs in Mass-Consumption Local Products), and various public and private incubators. These instruments aim to remove financing barriers, structure supply chains, and promote innovation.

According to the ministers, these measures rely on instruments like the Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise Promotion Agency (APME), the Transfagri project (to stimulate agricultural product transformation), and the Proto Fund (designed to help inventors develop prototypes). They claim these efforts have enabled thousands of young entrepreneurs to realize their projects, helped SMEs obtain financing—even if the need remains immense—and allowed artisans to progress in formalizing their businesses and standardizing their products. Thanks to the business creation centers, 21,132 companies were created in 2024, up from 19,651 in 2023, with 9,488 founded by young people.

While government officials express satisfaction and believe the strategy is promising, its effectiveness at scale remains severely hampered by an extremely burdensome, often repressive, bureaucracy. The administration has been slow to shift its mindset from control to genuine support, failing to internalize the critical need to foster a pool of viable small and micro-enterprises.

Corruption further weakens the impact of these measures. Not only is the selection of beneficiaries sometimes based on non-objective criteria, but financial support is occasionally diverted, at least in part, into the pockets of officials involved in the attribution chain.

The strategy is promising, its effectiveness at scale remains severely hampered by an extremely burdensome, often repressive, bureaucracy. The administration has been slow to shift its mindset from control to genuine support, failing to internalize the critical need to foster a pool of viable small and micro-enterprises.

Regarding the 200 billion CFA francs Guarantee Fund, a report from the Ministry of Economy indicates it is very poorly utilized. SMEs face extreme difficulty clearing the crucial hurdle of demonstrating "bankability" in their applications. In other words, the Finance Minister's aspiration to see a large number of SMEs access bank financing is far from being met.

In contrast, positive advancements have been observed in programs related to certification, packaging (Cameroon Food Packaging and Quality – CAPMACK-Q), and access to public procurement contracts. Similarly, the proliferation of trade fairs and exhibitions offers a vital showcase for Cameroonian ingenuity, confirming the absolute necessity for more pertinent and effective state supervision.

Your interview with Jean Paul Missi, Director General of Cameroon’s Housing Bank, revealed impressive figures: over 600 billion CFA francs injected into the economy and 100,000 homes constructed. Yet, the housing crisis persists, with a deficit exceeding 2 million units. How do you reconcile these official performance announcements with the reality on the ground? What did officials tell you about the real obstacles to housing access for ordinary Cameroonians?

To summarize the housing crisis with a few figures, we learn that the deficit stands at approximately 2 million units, generating a financing need estimated between 100 and 150 billion CFA francs per year. Aggravating factors include high urban growth and the poorly managed expansion of certain cities.

To help address this shortfall, the Crédit Foncier du Cameroun funds a wide range of projects: municipal housing estates, social housing, and university and school campuses. According to Director General Jean Paul Missi, the bank's social inclination is demonstrated by offering real estate loans at very low rates (1.5% to 7% inclusive of tax), prioritized for disadvantaged groups and youth. Microfinance institutions also serve as intermediaries for financing low-income housing.

However, as willing as these initiatives are, they are far from sufficient to meet the demand. The intended synergy between the housing bank, Société Immobilière du Cameroun (SIC), and Mission d’Aménagement des Terrains Urbains et Ruraux (MAETUR) has fizzled out. The banking sector, due to its orientation and procedures unsuited to a largely informal market, has yet to formulate adequate financing offers to capture this segment.

The banking sector, due to its orientation and procedures unsuited to a largely informal market, has yet to formulate adequate financing offers to capture this segment.

It is surprisingly shortsighted that the recent ordinance establishing investment incentives failed to include the construction sector. In addition to its high growth potential and social impact, construction could support industrial and tertiary development in key areas like ceramics, steelmaking, cement production, cabling, piping, and specialized finance and real estate. All these associated domains would, in turn, generate tens of thousands of jobs.

Finance Minister Louis Paul Motaze detailed reforms aimed at modernizing the Public Treasury, including the dematerialization of procedures (PROBMIS, PATRIMONY), and the public finance cleanup that the IMF has praised. As a public policy observer, how do you evaluate the gap between these modernization announcements and the reality of public management? Have officials convinced you of the true effectiveness of these reforms?

We must acknowledge that there has been a major qualitative leap in cleaning up public finances, modernizing the management of financial departments, and improving the relationship with taxpayers. Today,  taxpayers can declare their taxes from their office using their computer or phone and pay via bank transfer or mobile money.

The same efficiency applies to non-tax revenues, which are now collected digitally via software applications. This digitalization has genuinely reduced hassle for taxpayers and, I suspect, offers the state better revenue traceability and security.

Today, taxpayers can declare taxes from their office using their computer or phone and pay via bank transfer or mobile money.

However, the Finance Minister’s strong commitment is meeting fierce internal resistance to change. By eliminating cash circulation and reducing contact between users and financial staff, the dematerialization of payments has successfully dried up circuits of corruption and illicit enrichment.

This pushback directly results in administrative tactics designed to slow progress: manufactured system "bugs," severe delays in validation, and unwarranted intrusions into business affairs under the pretext of audits or tax adjustments.

Nevertheless, the reforms presented by Minister Louis Paul Motaze—modernizing the Public Treasury, dematerializing procedures via PROBMIS and PATRIMONY, and cleaning up public finances—demonstrate a clear ambition for modernization, transparency, and efficiency. These initiatives, which the IMF has applauded, provide, at least officially, a modern framework for securing state revenue and making spending more efficient.

By eliminating cash circulation and reducing contact between users and financial staff, the dematerialization of payments has successfully dried up circuits of corruption and illicit enrichment.

Your interviews touched on the state of the public-private dialogue and steps to improve the business climate. What did officials tell you about how this relationship is truly evolving? Can you confirm the progress they announced, and what are the private sector's chief unmet expectations?

The public-private dialogue has faced friction recently, specifically over the irregular scheduling of key institutional meetings. Business leaders’ primary complaint is that critical, jointly agreed-upon measures are implemented too slowly because of the heavy, counterproductive bureaucracy endemic to Cameroonian administration.

Despite this, our conversations with Ministers Alamine Ousmane Mey and Louis Paul Motaze show that these officials are placing increasing importance on the dialogue and on improving the business climate. They insist this focus is not a result of succumbing to any pressure or "dictation" from private actors. Minister Motaze has, in fact, made multiple visits to the business federation headquarters in Douala to discuss integrating private sector concerns more fully into new budget laws. He points to measures like simplifying tax and customs procedures, digitalizing public services, and creating loan guarantee mechanisms for SMEs as tools designed to streamline private sector activity.

On the ground, these initiatives have led to tangible effects: some SMEs are finding it easier to access credit, and administrative processing times have been reduced. Nevertheless, private sector leaders report several unmet expectations: bureaucracy lingers in many departments, access to long-term financing remains limited, and the effective promotion of "Made in Cameroon" often fails to translate into concrete support for local producers.

Regarding the "Made in Cameroon" initiative, glaring inconsistencies persist between official rhetoric and government actions. The government itself is a heavy consumer of imported goods, such as office furniture, even though local options are available. Furthermore, some books published to celebrate President Paul Biya, who is touted as a champion of "Made in Cameroon," were printed abroad. Local printers, despite being well-equipped, continue to be blocked by the administration from producing school textbooks, a measure the Prime Minister approved back in 2021. Even at major national ceremonies, imported flowers routinely fill official venues.

Regarding the "Made in Cameroon" initiative, glaring inconsistencies persist between official rhetoric and government actions. The government itself is a heavy consumer of imported goods, such as office furniture, even though local options are available.

Ultimately, the private sector is calling for a more coherent application of reforms and genuine continuity in their execution to ensure a lasting impact on competitiveness and job creation.

The Economy Minister extensively covered the Integrated Import Substitution Plan (PIISAH) and support for flagship companies. Does this strategy, based on your observations, appear to be producing the expected results? What do officials’ data and declarations suggest about the effectiveness of the import substitution policy?

François Bambou :To reduce the trade deficit and ensure food sovereignty, the government adopted the Integrated Agro-pastoral and Fisheries Import-Substitution Plan (PIISAH) for the 2024–2026 period. Based on the information and testimonies we gathered, the structural transformation strategy, led by PIISAH and support programs for flagship companies, is starting to produce tangible results, though only partially so far.

Indicators show a gradual drop in imports for certain products, such as frozen fish (down 8.3% in value in 2024), coupled with a surge in exports of processed goods, notably cocoa (up an impressive 115.5% in value). Companies receiving support have managed to boost both production and productivity. Simultaneously, investments in industrial capacity and the organization of local supply chains have fostered job creation.

Minister Alamine Ousmane Mey expects that by 2026, the measures taken under the Plan will led to a 70% drop in rice imports, with national production forecasted to reach 464.5 thousand tons. Maize production is projected to jump from 2.7 million tons to 4.3 million tons, and the combined output of bread flours is estimated to hit 303.6 thousand tons in 2026.

Minister Alamine Ousmane Mey expects that by 2026, the measures taken under the Plan will led to a 70% drop in rice imports, with national production forecasted to reach 464.5 thousand tons. Maize production is projected to jump from 2.7 million tons to 4.3 million tons, and the combined output of bread flours is estimated to hit 303.6 thousand tons in 2026.

In your editorial, you wrote about an "unfinished feeling," questioning whether promises were kept or simply became "lost illusions." After meeting with these officials, what is your personal assessment of the last seven-year term? Did their explanations convince you, or did they confirm your sense of a large, persistent gap between stated ambitions and concrete achievements?

Let’s not dwell too much time justifying delays in meeting objectives; there will always be an excuse for missed actions. The sheer number of delays in major projects means that excusing them would amount to condoning the "inertia" that President Biya himself criticizes within his own administration.

The sheer number of delays in major projects means that excusing them would amount to condoning the "inertia" that President Biya himself criticizes within his own administration.

Consider the facts: The 2021 Africa Cup of Nations (AFCON) was held in unfinished stadiums, despite the budgets for them being fully spent. The three-year Emergency Plan for accelerating growth, launched in 2015, remains incomplete a decade later. The automated toll project, first studied in 2009 and given a construction contract in 2019, is still not operational sixteen years on. We could list dozens of large projects, and hundreds of medium-sized ones, that have never come to fruition because of this heavy administration.

As we stressed in our editorial, Cameroon certainly hasn't collapsed over the last seven years, but it's moving far too slowly. The country's progress is, in a sense, hostage to the cronyism and rampant illicit enrichment that plague the high civil service.

The country's progress is, in a sense, hostage to the cronyism and rampant illicit enrichment that plague the high civil service.

The government's files are full of revolutionary plans, but they are all sinking in the maze of a bureaucracy known to be as tangled as it is corrupt. A thousand programs and strategies won't change the daily lives of Cameroonians until this bureaucracy is fundamentally restructured, rebooted, and redirected toward service delivery, performance, and accountability.

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