• ECOWAS central bank governors reaffirm a 2027 target for launching the Eco.

• Nigeria signals that the first phase could exclude UEMOA’s eight CFA-franc countries.

• Nigeria and Ghana, key candidates for the first wave, still face high inflation, currency pressure and fiscal fragilities.

Governors of central banks from twelve member states of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) revived the long-delayed single currency project last week in Monrovia, Liberia. Officials set 2027 as the stated objective. Policymakers continue technical discussions following decisions taken at the December 2025 summit in Abuja, where heads of state reaffirmed their commitment to accelerate fiscal and monetary convergence.

However, a statement from Nigeria’s presidency altered the equation. Authorities indicated that the first phase of the Eco project could proceed without countries from the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA). This scenario would exclude the eight states that already share a common currency and a unified central bank.

“The first phase of implementation should concern Liberia, Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Guinea and The Gambia, subject to compliance with agreed macroeconomic convergence criteria and the finalization of institutional governance structures,” the Nigerian presidency stated.

A Two-Speed Monetary Union?

The 2027 version of the Eco could therefore emerge without the CFA franc zone. This hypothesis reshapes the historical balance of the project and revives the prospect of a multi-speed monetary union. The eight UEMOA countries — Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo — already share the CFA franc, which the Central Bank of West African States issues and which remains pegged to the euro.

In 2019–2020, these states approved a symbolic reform that rebranded the CFA franc as the “Eco” within the UEMOA zone. Authorities ended the requirement to centralize part of foreign exchange reserves with the French Treasury and removed French representatives from governance bodies. Policymakers aimed to modernize the institutional framework, strengthen perceived sovereignty and prepare for eventual expansion to the full ECOWAS bloc. However, this reform did not deliver the 15-member single currency initially envisioned.

In this context, the potential absence of UEMOA countries from the first wave raises the issue of variable-geometry integration. Persistent macroeconomic divergences between anglophone and francophone economies have hindered the Eco project for years. Countries display heterogeneous inflation levels, high fiscal deficits, rising public debt and significant exchange rate volatility. Recent shocks, including inflationary pressures and currency tensions, have further complicated the path.

Regional authorities now appear to favor pragmatism. Policymakers may choose to advance with a core group of countries that they consider politically ready to pool monetary sovereignty and harmonize fiscal policies rather than wait for perfect convergence among all fifteen member states.

A Core Group Far From Convergence

However, a paradox emerges. The group highlighted by Abuja currently meets fewer convergence benchmarks than UEMOA. In other words, the least convergent economies could become the first to share a currency.

Nigeria, the region’s largest economy, illustrates this imbalance. The country faces persistent double-digit inflation, sustained pressure on the naira and repeated exchange-rate adjustments. Nigeria accounts for more than half of ECOWAS GDP, and its stability would mechanically condition the viability of any future monetary union.

Ghana, another expected pillar, also faces constraints. The economy is gradually recovering after a debt crisis and an IMF program. However, inflation remains elevated, public debt remains heavy and the currency remains vulnerable to external shocks. These conditions complicate the construction of a credible common monetary base.

The central question therefore shifts from timing to macroeconomic credibility. A monetary union launched without UEMOA but anchored by still-fragile economies would create an unprecedented challenge. Authorities would need to build monetary discipline around states that remain in uncertain adjustment trajectories rather than around an already stabilized core.

The challenge grows more complex because Côte d’Ivoire, which represents about 40% of UEMOA GDP, has not signaled any intention to shift toward a broader monetary zone. Abidjan may hesitate to dilute its leading role within the current union and to expose itself to turbulence from more commodity-dependent economies, particularly Nigeria, which remains closely tied to oil price fluctuations.

Eco as a Political Break for the Sahel?

What appears as an institutional complication could evolve into a political opportunity for members of the Alliance of Sahel States — Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. These governments have framed criticism of the CFA franc as a foundational element of their sovereignty doctrine. Their grievance targets not the idea of a common currency but its historical peg to France and the euro.

In this context, an Eco launched without UEMOA and without the CFA framework could serve as a symbolic rupture. A regional currency detached from the colonial legacy could prove more politically marketable than incremental reform of the existing system. The most economically fragile scenario could therefore become the most politically powerful, as monetary reform in these capitals primarily carries narrative weight.

In Senegal, Prime Minister Ousmane Sonko has revived the debate on monetary sovereignty. He has described the CFA franc as an instrument of control rather than stability and has called for deep reform rather than symbolic adjustments.

The ultimate viability of the Eco will depend on whether these political positions can align with the technical and macroeconomic constraints required to establish a credible and durable monetary union, as the official communiqué itself notes by emphasizing an architecture inspired by the European Union model.

Fiacre E. Kakpo