• Governor André Wameso told Bloomberg he will prioritise restoring credibility to the Congolese franc and reversing decades of dollarisation during his term.
• The Central Bank of Congo sold fifty million United States dollars on 18 August 2025 to calm foreign exchange markets and signal a shift from passive management.
• An IMF 2024 consultation found that approximately eighty-five to ninety percent of bank loans and ninety-five percent of deposits were denominated in foreign currency, mainly dollars.

The newly appointed Governor of the Central Bank of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), André Wameso, told Bloomberg in a quoted interview that restoring the credibility of the Congolese franc and rolling back decades of dollarisation will define his term. He argued that monetary sovereignty is impossible when households, firms, and even the government treat the dollar as the default unit of account, store of value, and medium of exchange.

IMF data back his diagnosis: the Fund’s recent consultation report under Article IV disclosed that 85 to 90 percent of bank loans and roughly 95 percent of deposits were denominated in foreign currency, mainly dollars, and updated figures released in July 2025 show these ratios have barely moved. Such a level of dollarisation not only blunts the central bank’s ability to transmit monetary policy but also leaves the economy highly sensitive to swings in the exchange rate and to global liquidity conditions.

To demonstrate resolve, the BCC moved quickly after Wameso took office on 4 August. On 18 August, it sold 50 million dollars on the interbank market at 2,776 Congolese francs per dollar, a transparent intervention intended both to calm immediate foreign-exchange tensions and to signal that the era of passive management is over.

The step was taken against a backdrop of already tight monetary conditions: the policy rate has been held at 25 percent since August 2023, helping to bring annual inflation down to 8.2 percent by the end of July 2025. The Governor stressed that this restrictive stance will remain in place until inflation expectations are durably anchored and the franc regains a stable store-of-value reputation.

Wameso’s plan rests on three mutually reinforcing pillars. The first is currency stability achieved through limited but well-telegraphed foreign-exchange sales, clear communication on the inflation target, and continued monetary tightness. The second pillar is the deliberate creation of structural demand for franc-denominated assets. To that end, nd the central bank will keep yields on its own bills attractive relative to inflation, while the Treasury will expand the supply of government securities issued in CDF.

A parallel effort will channel domestic-currency credit toward the housing sector, deepening the market and giving savers a tangible reason to hold francs. The third pillar is the systematic reduction of frictions in the everyday use of the currency. Building on a directive issued in June 2024 that forced all electronic-payment terminals to accept only Congolese francs from 31 July, the BCC will work with fintech firms and commercial banks to ensure that paying school fees, utility bills, or groceries in CDF is as effortless as reaching for dollars.

Yet the path is strewn with risks. A transition that is too abrupt could push foreign-currency activity into the parallel market, widen price dispersion, and fuel public distrust. Sterilised dollar sales—selling greenbacks without corresponding capital inflows—would further erode already thin official reserves, which covered only about two and a half months of imports at the end of last year.

The IMF's new program signed in January 2025 aims to lift coverage to three months by 2026, but that timeline could slip if reserve losses accelerate. There is also the danger that mandated conversion of bank balance sheets from dollars to francs might leave borrowers unable to service their debts, raising non-performing-loan ratios and undermining financial stability.

Over the next six months, three indicators will tell whether the strategy is gaining traction: the spread between the official and parallel exchange rates, the uptake of newly issued CDF-denominated government paper, and the share of mobile and electronic payments actually executed in francs. If these gauges move in the right direction, confidence could become self-reinforcing and the country might finally begin to reclaim its currency.

By placing de-dollarisation at the centre of his mandate and stating that intention in his earliest international interview, Governor Wameso has set a clear benchmark for success. The task is enormous, the hazards real, but the roadmap is coherent: stabilise the franc, make it rewarding to hold, and make it effortless to use. Execution will determine whether the DRC enters a new era of monetary sovereignty.

Idriss Linge