• Efforts to update the definition of “conflict diamonds” stalled again in Dubai

• Civil society, producers, and Western states remain split on how far reforms should go

• Diverging economic, political, and security interests make consensus harder to reach

The latest plenary session of the Kimberley Process (KP) ended in mid-November in Dubai without adopting a proposal to change its definition of “conflict diamonds.” The outcome reflects the diverging interests of members within a system built on consensus. And while African producers may appear to be the main losers, the statements issued by the various actors point to a more complex picture.

Created in 2003 through an agreement between governments, civil society, and the diamond industry, the KP was designed to curb trade in diamonds that could finance rebel groups fighting legitimate authorities. The certification system helped reduce the share of such stones in global trade, which is now estimated at about 1% of market value, compared with nearly 15% in the late 1990s.

Limits of a narrow definition

Despite these gains, the KP has faced growing criticism. One central issue is its current definition of conflict diamonds. Originally crafted during the era of major African civil wars, it does not cover other forms of contemporary violence. It excludes abuses in mining areas involving militias aligned with governments, private security actors, or criminal networks with no intention of toppling a state.

Under pressure from civil society, the KP set up a committee in 2022 to consider a definition better suited to today’s realities. Discussions led to a draft proposal presented from Nov. 17 to 21, 2025, in Dubai. According to the African Diamond Producers Association (ADPA), which supported the revision, the proposal included non-state armed groups, individuals or entities sanctioned by the UN Security Council, and their allies. It also targeted actions that could finance armed conflict, undermine legitimate governments, or harm communities living around diamond operations.

The ADPA said six participants refused to approve the text: the European Union, which represented its 27 member states, as well as Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, and Ukraine. It added that the KP Civil Society Coalition, which acts as an observer, also withheld its support.

A reform with blurred contours

Beyond the rejection, the debate exposed disagreements over what the reform should actually include. The World Diamond Council (WDC) said the draft definition went much further, covering militias, mercenaries, organized criminals, and private military companies. Like the ADPA, the industry defended a narrower text to avoid infringing on member states’ sovereignty, in contrast with the Coalition’s position. WDC President Feriel Zerouki argued that several participants were pushing the Kimberley Process to act beyond its mandate by intervening in sovereign decisions and state actions, even though it is not a political or security body.

This divergence highlights one of the main stumbling blocks. Including violence involving state actors would have brought renewed attention to the Central African Republic. The country saw a 2024 lifting of the embargo on rough diamond exports after more than a decade of restrictions linked to the role of diamonds in financing armed groups. At the same time, security companies linked to Wagner—now reorganized under Africa Corps and operating with government backing—have faced accusations of human rights abuses and illicit mining.

In Tanzania, too, a broader definition could have raised questions. The Williamson mine has faced allegations of violence by security agents against artisanal miners working on or near the concession. Human rights groups and legal firms have documented claims of shootings, beatings, and other abuses. Operator Petra Diamonds acknowledged the allegations and implemented internal reforms along with a compensation agreement for plaintiffs.

These examples illustrate the grey areas that civil society says should be part of the definition, including abuses committed by government forces. In his closing remarks in Dubai, Civil Society Coalition coordinator Jaff Bamenjo said several participants sought to exclude such cases. He noted that several participants maintained that violence should be treated as an issue only when it is committed by non-state actors, not when it involves governments at war or police and military forces using excessive force against communities.

The divergence, however, extends beyond human rights concerns. It is also rooted in economic dynamics. According to Hans Merket of the Belgian research organization IPIS, a Coalition member, African producers are under pressure from falling demand for natural diamonds and rising competition from synthetics. Speaking to Ecofin Agency, he said the debate over the definition has become a way to defend the credibility of a certification system seen as essential for maintaining buyer confidence.

An uncertain future for the Kimberley Process

The stalemate in Dubai raises broader questions about the KP’s ability to evolve. The discussions showed that each group of participants brought its own priorities—whether protecting state sovereignty, safeguarding the credibility of the certification system, or meeting consumer demands for transparency. These competing objectives make reform difficult in a system that requires unanimity and allows any participant to block a decision.

Civil society argues that this structural constraint makes the adoption of a stricter definition unlikely, even if a proposal were approved. It also notes that embargoes remain the KP’s only enforcement tool, a response seen as ill-suited to varied security contexts and whose effectiveness is contested. The experience of the Central African Republic suggests that embargoes, when applied alone, can fuel clandestine trade and push transactions into informal circuits.

Merket argued that the discussions focused more on managing the Process’s image than on pursuing substantive change. He said participants did not address which problems the KP should tackle or what tools it should use to achieve concrete progress, and that the debate resembled a rebranding effort rather than a push for meaningful improvements on the ground. said Merket.

Against this backdrop, several shifts are emerging. Western countries—particularly the EU and G7 members—are developing new traceability mechanisms, which may explain their veto of the definition change. These systems largely aim to restrict the entry of Russian diamonds into European and North American markets amid the war in Ukraine. Russia remains one of the world’s leading producers of rough diamonds, and these measures seek to strengthen sanctions adopted since 2022.

Canadian organization IMPACT, also part of the Coalition, notes that these new approaches, built outside the KP framework, create a parallel governance system that fragments regulation and further marginalizes the multilateral process when it fails to adapt. African producer states are watching these developments carefully. Along with the WDC, the ADPA reaffirmed its support for the KP, which it views as the only universally recognized framework for governing international rough diamond trade.

But as these approaches advance, is the KP moving toward a more advisory role? Will it clarify its mandate and upgrade its tools to remain relevant in the industry? These are the questions upcoming KP meetings in 2026 may help answer.

Emiliano Tossou