• Africa holds 30% of global critical mineral reserves but lacks adequate export infrastructure.
• Major powers (Japan, US, EU, China) invest billions in corridors like Nacala and Lobito, primarily for mineral export.
• These projects risk prioritizing external mineral needs over African industrial development and regional integration.

At the 9th Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD 9) in late August 2025, Japan announced a $7 billion investment in the Nacala corridor, alongside the African Development Bank and other partners. Europe and the United States focus on the Lobito corridor, and China consolidates its grip on similar infrastructure. This Japanese initiative illustrates the race among major powers to control African critical metal export routes. However, behind the promised billions lies the risk of projects disconnected from African priorities, carrying schemes the continent seeks to overcome.

Graphite, Copper, Cobalt: Streamlining Exports

In the continent's southeast, the Nacala corridor connects the Mozambican port of the same name to Zambia and Malawi. Zambia, Africa's second-largest copper producer after the DRC, also possesses significant cobalt reserves. Malawi, for its part, emerges as one of Africa's next graphite producers.

The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs mentions the transport of various goods. However, it emphasizes that "the region surrounding the Nacala corridor is endowed with abundant mineral resources," whose export the announced investment will facilitate. The 912 km line could notably serve the Kasiya project in Malawi, led by Australia's Sovereign Metals, which plans a 6 km rail spur connecting its future plant to the corridor.

"This initiative offers multiple strategic advantages to Kasiya, positioning the project as a key beneficiary of Japan's mineral security strategy. Japanese company Toho Titanium previously validated that Kasiya's rutile met the required specifications for high-performance metallic titanium production, thus establishing proven market access for Japanese industrial consumers," the company has already stated.

To the west, the Lobito corridor receives support from the United States, which announced over $4 billion in financial commitments, and the European Union. It aims to connect southern DRC, the world's second-largest copper producer and supplier of 70% of global cobalt, and northern Zambia to the Angolan port of Lobito. Its promoters highlight reduced transit times compared to routes passing through South Africa or Mozambique.

China, meanwhile, strengthens its foothold via TAZARA, the railway line built in the 1970s between Zambia and Tanzania. It already transports Zambian copper and cobalt and could soon carry Tanzanian graphite production to the port of Dar es Salaam. Entrusted for 30 years to the Chinese state-owned company CCECC, TAZARA will receive a $1.4 billion investment to modernize the infrastructure. This aims to achieve a capacity of 3 million tonnes of minerals per year, according to Tanzanian Finance Minister Mwigulu Nchemba.

Whether Nacala, Lobito, or TAZARA, the observation remains consistent: corridors supported by major powers primarily aim to meet their critical mineral needs. For China, it involves supplying its factories with raw materials and maintaining its dominance in global supply. The United States, the European Union, and Japan seek to escape this dominance through initiatives that reduce supply chain dependence on Beijing.

Lobito, Symbol of Disconnection

In this context, local industrial development, diversification into agriculture or energy, or even the opening to reliable passenger traffic, remain relegated to the background. This recalls extractive logics dating back to the continent's colonial past. At that time, transport infrastructures primarily served to ship minerals and agricultural products from colonies to metropolises.

However, this logic sidelines African countries' priorities. A report published in May 2025 by the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) notes that the Lobito Atlantic Railway consortium still focuses its activity on transporting copper and cobalt. Yet, the official commitment involves expanding the corridor to agriculture and energy to strengthen its socio-economic impact.

Regarding Lobito, the French Institute for International and Strategic Affairs (IRIS) noted in June 2025 a delay in implementing logistical, port, and intermodal infrastructure. Planned logistical hubs in Huambo, Luau, and Chingola remain in the planning stage, thus confining the corridor to an export-oriented logic instead of making it a tool for regional integration for agricultural and industrial SMEs. The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) emphasizes this corridor's potential to boost agricultural trade. In 2022, for example, agricultural products accounted for 23% of DRC's exports to Angola and 76% of Zambia's exports to Angola.

The African Agenda

Realizing these corridors' potential will require considering the agenda of the African countries involved. These nations notably want to locally transform their mineral products. This applies to Tanzania with nickel, and also to Zambia and the DRC. The two main African copper producers have a joint electric battery factory project. The Lobito corridor can notably serve to import necessary equipment and export finished products. For UNECA, it will also be necessary to protect existing economic activities along the lines and apply genuine local content policies so that SMEs can benefit.

Without diversification and appropriation by states, these infrastructures risk repeating past extractive logics, where railways primarily served to evacuate African wealth outwards. Beyond the sovereignty issue, a risk of under-exploitation of currently established logistics chains even exists, which could threaten their commercial viability. According to the ECDPM, the new Lobito corridor line (between Luacano in Angola and Chingola in Zambia), whose cost is estimated at $5 billion for 730 km, relies on "unrealistic" copper and cobalt export forecasts, for example.

This article was initially published in French by Emiliano Tossou

Adapted in French by Ange Jason Quenum