• IPIS report says diamond embargo failed to stop rebel financing in Central African Republic
• Rebel groups increased control over mines despite export restrictions imposed since 2013
• Experts urge reforms to broaden conflict diamond definition and strengthen oversight

The diamond embargo imposed on the Central African Republic (CAR) failed to stop rebel groups from financing their operations, according to a new report by the International Peace Information Service (IPIS). The report, published in mid-June 2025, comes just months after the Kimberley Process (KP) lifted the last remaining restrictions on CAR diamond exports.

The findings reflect broader concerns about the effectiveness of the Kimberley Process, a global diamond certification scheme created in 2003 to prevent diamond trade from fueling armed conflicts.

The export embargo was first imposed on CAR in 2013 following a coup d’état. In line with its mission to block rebel financing worldwide, the KP excluded CAR to prevent diamonds from funding armed groups. However, after interviewing miners, traders, government officials, and civil society members, IPIS concluded that the embargo missed its goal.

The report, “Diamonds, Conflict and Crime in the Central African Republic: The Lifting of the Last Kimberley Process Embargo,” reveals that rebel factions actually increased production at mining sites under their control after the embargo and set up parallel administrations to tax miners.

Although CAR secured a partial lifting of the embargo in 2016, smuggling remained widespread. The country’s complex geography adds to the problem, with mining zones often spanning both “compliant” and “non-compliant” areas, creating loopholes in the system.

“This compartmentalization creates opportunities for diamonds from non-compliant sites to be misrepresented as originating from compliant areas. While CAR’s chain-of-custody system requires traders to present purchase slips documenting a diamond’s origin, the informal nature of many transactions and the sheer number of scattered mines across vast regions makes thorough verification extremely difficult,” the IPIS report explains.

Unintended Consequences of the Embargo

Beyond failing to curb rebel financing, the embargo also harmed small-scale miners. Traders introduced a “risk premium” that reduced the price paid to miners, while access to financing dried up. In Boda, once one of CAR’s top diamond hubs, miners say foreign investors used to supply equipment and pre-finance operations, but now they are left on their own.

The embargo also pushed the diamond trade underground, boosting criminal networks. The report accuses state officials of complicity.

“Even after the partial lifting of the embargo, the formal trade struggled to regain ground, as smuggling remained far more lucrative and continued unchecked due to widespread impunity. The KP ultimately failed in its core mission in CAR. The embargo harmed vulnerable mining communities while not succeeding in curbing illicit activity,” the report concludes.

A Broader Kimberley Process Blind Spot

This is not the first time the KP has faced criticism for failing to control the diamond trade. Over 15 years ago, Canadian group Partnership Africa Canada (now IMPACT) raised concerns over flaws in diamond certification in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in a 2009 report.

The group revealed that nearly half of DRC’s diamond exports could not be properly traced. “The 2008 Annual Review revealed a growing discrepancy between the DRC’s export statistics as recorded by the Ministry of Mines and those filed by Congolese authorities with the Kimberley Process. The difference amounted to millions of carats and tens of millions of dollars,” the report read.

Beyond data concerns, the Kimberley Process Civil Society Coalition has long argued that the KP’s narrow definition of “conflict diamonds” limits progress toward an ethical supply chain. Currently, the definition only applies to diamonds funding rebel groups, excluding cases where state security forces or private security contractors linked to governments commit human rights abuses.

The presence of Russia’s Wagner Group in CAR illustrates the loophole. In exchange for helping the government fight rebels, Wagner reportedly received mining concessions.

“By lifting its last conflict diamond embargo, the KP seems to imply that conflict diamonds no longer exist, raising existential questions about its continued relevance […] If the scheme cannot recognize conflict diamonds in CAR—where armed actors still exploit parts of the diamond trade — it is difficult to imagine it identifying them anywhere else,” the IPIS report warns.

Pathways for Reform

Despite these failures, experts say there is still a chance to secure a blood-free diamond supply chain. In CAR, IPIS urges the government to strengthen logistical capacity to monitor remote mining sites and properly track each batch of diamonds, rather than relying on sporadic site visits and easily falsified purchase slips.

The report also recommends greater transparency by publishing a complete map of both artisanal and industrial mining sites, as well as licenses and ownership details. The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) suspended CAR in November 2024, just days before the embargo was lifted, citing transparency failures and a lack of civil society participation.

At a systemic level, the Kimberley Process Civil Society Coalition calls for revising the definition of “conflict diamonds” to cover human rights abuses committed by state forces and for transferring audit responsibilities to independent bodies, rather than leaving them to peer reviews between states.

However, any reforms face political challenges, as KP decisions rely on consensus among member states. While this approach facilitates cooperation, it also blocks changes opposed by some countries.

The need for reform is urgent, as lab-grown diamonds, seen as more ethical by consumers, continue to gain market share, posing an increasing threat to the natural diamond industry.

First published in French by Emiliano Tossou

Edited in English by Firmine AIZAN