• S&P sees CFA franc devaluation as unlikely as reserves near 5 months of imports and inflation falls below 3%.

• Monetary calm secures parity, but growth stays weak, and 37% of CEMAC’s population remains in extreme poverty.

• Credit favours state debt over firms, slowing diversification; the test is turning stability into broad, lasting growth.

For several months now, the question of a CFA franc devaluation in the CEMAC zone has regularly resurfaced in public debate, fueled by structural weaknesses in the region's economies and the still-vivid memory of the 2016 monetary crisis. Yet the most recent signals point to a clear conclusion: in the short term, the risk of devaluation has receded significantly. S&P Global Ratings considers this scenario unlikely, an assessment consistent with data published by the Bank of Central African States and the World Bank.

As of end-2025, CEMAC's foreign exchange reserves cover nearly five months of imports, a level substantially above the critical threshold generally used by international financial institutions. Inflation, which had weighed heavily on households after the pandemic and the global energy shock, has sharply declined, falling back below 3% on a regional average, thanks to normalising import prices and more transparent monetary policy. BEAC was thus able to begin a cautious easing in 2025, breaking with several years of tightening dictated by external pressures.

This nominal stability represents an important achievement. It secures the CFA franc parity, reduces negative expectations, and provides states with a more predictable macroeconomic environment. But it should not obscure a less comfortable reality: monetary stabilization has not yet produced deep economic transformation. Regional growth remains moderate and, above all, insufficient to substantially improve living standards. According to the World Bank, nearly 37% of CEMAC residents still live in extreme poverty, and per capita income growth remains essentially flat.

The real imbalance is now domestic

The heart of the problem has shifted. It no longer lies primarily in the balance of payments or the exchange rate regime, but in the internal functioning of the region's economies. Despite monetary easing, credit to the private sector is growing slowly and remains expensive, particularly for small and medium-sized enterprises. Banks, facing what they perceive as a risky environment and high prudential constraints, overwhelmingly favor government securities, whose outstanding volumes have risen sharply since 2023.

This choice is rational from a banking perspective, but it carries a macroeconomic cost. It limits financing for productive investment, slows economic diversification, and maintains persistent dependence on hydrocarbons and commodities. BEAC data nevertheless shows a mixed dynamic: while certain outputs, such as natural gas, are growing rapidly in countries like Congo, these gains remain concentrated and poorly distributed across the wider economy.

The current situation places CEMAC in a delicate equation. Monetary stability, long considered the priority objective, is no longer sufficient in itself. The real challenge now is transmitting this stability to the real economy: redirecting credit toward productive sectors, improving the business climate, securing legal protection for investment, and effectively implementing the structural reforms announced at regional summits.

Failing that, the risk is not a sudden crisis, but prolonged stagnation. A "top-down" macroeconomic stability, reassuring to markets and rating agencies, but socially costly and politically fragile. Devaluation is no longer the immediate threat. The real test for CEMAC now is its ability to transform restored monetary equilibrium into shared and sustainable prosperity.

Idriss Linge