• Mali’s gold output is said to have dropped 32% after Barrick halts the Loulo-Gounkoto mine.
• The government enforces a 35% local ownership requirement, thereby increasing state influence.
• Over 560B XOF spent to expand gold and lithium development.

Mali’s gold sector appears to be heading towards significant disruption in 2025, as a dispute between the military-led government and Barrick Gold Corporation weighs on production. According to a Ministry of Mines document first reported by Reuters, industrial output fell 32 percent year-over-year to 26.2 tons by the end of August. The shortfall is said to be directly linked to the suspension of operations at the Loulo-Gounkoto complex, one of Mali’s largest mines, after government measures, including blocked exports and the seizure of gold stockpiles, forced Barrick to halt activity in January.

Mali is among Africa’s leading gold producers, with industrial mining a cornerstone of its export earnings. Loulo-Gounkoto, acquired by Barrick in 2019 through its merger with Randgold Resources, typically produces between 500,000 and 600,000 ounces of gold annually, equivalent to approximately 15 to 18 metric tons. This represents a substantial portion of the country’s overall production. The mine also supports thousands of jobs and contracts with local suppliers, contributions that have been interrupted since the suspension.

The dispute has its roots in Mali’s revised mining code, adopted in August 2023. The new rules increased the government’s mandatory equity stake in projects to at least 20 percent and raised royalties on gold exports from 6.5 to 10 percent. Additional measures included stricter requirements for the use of local labor and suppliers, as well as the introduction of new profit-based taxes during periods of high commodity prices. While Barrick acknowledged the code, the company argued that its 2016 mining convention contained stability clauses valid until 2032, which guaranteed fiscal terms. Negotiations with the government failed to resolve these differences. By late 2024, authorities had blocked gold exports, detained several Barrick staff on tax-related charges, and seized large volumes of gold.

By June 2025, a Malian court had placed Loulo-Gounkoto under the management of a state administrator. The court-appointed overseer announced plans in July to sell one metric ton of stored gold to cover short-term costs. Meanwhile, Barrick launched arbitration proceedings at the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes in January 2025, arguing that Mali had violated both its convention and international investment treaties. The World Bank’s tribunal confirmed in May that the case could go ahead, and hearings on provisional measures were held in July. No ruling has been issued so far, leaving the dispute unresolved.

Government spending also points to a broader reorientation of Mali’s resource policy. The Ministry of Mines has reported expenditures of more than 560 billion XOF for mineral resource development in the first half of 2025. This amount appears to cover not only gold but also other minerals, such as lithium. This investment aligns with the gradual implementation of the 2023 mining code. As of June 6, official records showed state shareholdings in 6 gold mining companies at 20 percent; however, in August, the government began applying a 35 percent local ownership rule intended to increase the participation of both the state and Malian investors.

Loulo-Gounkoto was expected to contribute around 7.8 tons of gold in 2025, but Barrick removed the mine from its forecasts after suspending operations. Ministry projections suggested that, if activity resumed, the site could still add 17.5 tons to annual output, but progress has been slow under state administration. Limited operations have continued since July, but at only a fraction of their original capacity. The government has also moved seized gold worth an estimated $117 million, which has affected stock levels without altering production figures.

For now, the gold sector continues to function through other mines that remain active, but the sharp decline in national output reflects the scale of Loulo-Gounkoto’s importance. The outcome of arbitration proceedings, as well as the government’s broader push to strengthen its role in the sector through higher ownership and increased spending, will determine whether production stabilizes in the coming year. The developments highlight the intersection of legal disputes, policy reform, and economic pressures that define Mali’s mining landscape in 2025.

Idriss Linge